


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# Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

In Collaboration with Representative Scholars  
throughout the Church

Founded by SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

VOLUME X

OCTOBER, 1927

NUMBER 2

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OCTOBER, 1927

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EDITED BY THE REV. FREDERICK CLIFTON GRANT, D.D., Dean of the Western Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois, and the REV. BURTON SCOTT EASTON, D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation and Literature, General Theological Seminary, New York City

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## REUNION AND THE ROMAN SEE

By FRANCIS J. HALL, General Theological Seminary

I contributed to the October, 1925, issue of this REVIEW an account of "The Anglican Movement for Reunion"; and again, in the issue of October, 1926, on "Requirements for Reunion." In these articles the reference was largely to efforts being made to unite Anglicans and Protestants; and the fact that the Anglican Communion, although protestant against Vatican claims, belongs to the Catholic rather than the Protestant section of Christendom was kept in view as a controlling premise.

Unless these articles were radically astray in argument, I am justified in saying that the reunion movement there considered is now at the cross-roads, and is in danger of taking the wrong turn. The alternatives are the educational and the schematic. *The World Conference was planned for educational purposes exclusively, to bring about a proper understanding of the differences which have to be remedied in order to make wholesome, abiding, Christian reunion possible. And the understanding of differences has to be followed by fresh study, in a new spirit.*

Furthermore, the only agreement that can bring divine blessing on reunion is one that proceeds from common acceptance of the mind of Christ—of the truths revealed, and of the arrangements

made, by His authority and under the guidance of His Holy Spirit, and preserved in the historic Catholic system. Without a common allegiance of believers to this system, there can be no visible unity of Christendom; and the restoration of such allegiance will obviously require divine aid, much prayerful study, and much time. Attempts to force the pace in obliviousness of these conditions of success must end in failure.

The Anglican Communion, I have shown, retains in its prescriptions the Catholic system. It does this in spite of the anomalies that have been and are tolerated in its midst. The Anglo-Catholic movement, whatever may be said of certain of its accidents, brings to articulate assertion principles that are embodied either explicitly or by implication in the Prayer Book.

The differences which separate Anglicans and Nonconformists, therefore, fundamentally speaking, are those which separate Catholics and Protestants. The statements of agreement which have been drafted and signed by Anglicans and Nonconformists are misleading for two reasons: (a) They are too hopelessly inadequate to warrant the assumption that their acceptance constitutes a step towards reunion; (b) in their seemingly significant elements they are incurably ambiguous. Those who accept them explain them in mutually inconsistent senses, forced to do so in order to justify their action to the believers whom they ostensibly represent. Furthermore, from the nature of the case, these statements are limited to what Protestants can accept, as interpreted by themselves. They indicate no real advance towards the determinative elements of the Catholic position.

It being certain that world-wide Christian union requires a general return to ancient Catholic principles, there is involved for Protestants a recovery, in purified forms of course, of the sacramental and other essential Catholic elements which they abandoned in the sixteenth century. For Anglicans there is needed a more abundant and united realization of their Catholic inheritance, and a dutiful application of it along the lines of sacramental practice and discipline. For Orthodox Easterns there is required a larger outlook, and a more discriminating understanding of

Western mentalities, movements and difficulties. For Roman Catholics there is demanded fresh study of the alleged divine sanction of Vatican claims, and of the ecumenically binding force of certain doctrines and practices of non-primitive origin, and not found in Scripture.

Reunion with Rome left out does not satisfy the requirements of Christian unity. In labouring for this unity, therefore, we also have need to study afresh the case for Roman claims and distinctive doctrines. The purpose of this article is limited to summarizing the existing issues between the Roman and Anglican Churches, as an Anglican sees them today, under the heads of Primacy, Infallibility and Unity. What I am to give is not a full argument, but a Syllabus.

#### I. THE ROMAN PRIMACY

In discussing this subject we should keep in mind the somewhat elastic use of the term "primacy" in Christian history. We should not, as do certain Anglicans, treat the absence of ancient evidence for papal claims in their Vatican form as disproving primitive acceptance of Roman Primacy in any form; nor should we, as do certain papal apologists, regard evidence of a generally accepted Roman Primacy in the early Church as establishing the ecumenical validity of Papal Primacy in its modern Vatican sense. The nature of the "primacy" in each case needs investigation. The term is equally applicable to a mere *ex officio* chairmanship or leadership and to an autocratic despotism. I proceed to particulars.

(a) It has become increasingly clear that some kind of continuing primacy of the Roman See in the universal Church was generally taken for granted by the ancient Fathers, this consent gaining unmistakable expression at the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon.

(b) The belief that this primacy was necessarily involved in Petrine succession, and formally appointed by Christ Himself, was by no means so generally in evidence. The Lord's commission and promise to St. Peter was variously interpreted, and the

Council of Chalcedon followed no new line when, in its twenty-eighth canon, it spoke of the Primacy as *given to Rome by the Fathers, and given on account of the place occupied by that city in the Empire*. It has to be acknowledged, of course, that the general belief that the Roman See was established by St. Peter served to enhance the reverence paid to that See, and to fortify its primatial status. But the Primacy appears to have been accepted *before* this association of ideas was developed.

(c) The authority and prerogatives anciently recognized as involved in the Roman Primacy fell very far short indeed of the universal "ordinary jurisdiction" asserted by the Vatican Council. What was generally accepted did not exceed an *ex officio* leadership—not precisely defined, but including the right to exercise "solicitude," as Viscount Halifax expresses it, in an active way in the ecumenical sphere. Papal invasions of jurisdiction could be, and were, resisted without breach of Catholic unity; and papal excommunication of those outside the Roman province did not *ipso facto* involve exclusion from the Catholic Church. The case of Victor and the Asiatics illustrates this.

(d) There is no evidence that the Roman Primacy was instituted by Christ and is therefore formally possessed of divine right. Granting, as I think we should, that Peter himself was the rock on which Christ said, "I will build My Church," the fact remains that a rock of foundation does not necessarily signify a ruling office. No charge was given to St. Peter that was not either given also to the Twelve or fulfilled once for all in the personal leadership exercised by him in building the Church. Moreover, there is no evidence whatever that the Lord provided for the transmission of Peter's leadership, such as it was, to the bishops of Rome, and in perpetuity. *The statement of Chalcedon that it was the Fathers who gave the primacy to Rome holds the field, and appears to establish its ecclesiastical and human origin; and the authority which created can and may not only enlarge, but also reduce and even abolish, what it created.*

(e) The fact that human factors explain the gradual development of the Roman Primacy recognized by the Fathers into the

supreme *magisterium* and universal "ordinary jurisdiction" asserted by the Vatican Council is sufficiently apparent to open-minded historical students. Equally evident is the fact that, whereas in its ancient and very limited form the Roman Primacy was accepted by the whole Church, its development into Vaticanism has never received such acceptance, but is provincial. The Eastern Orthodox abiding refusal signifies this. To these facts should be added increasing signs that the Vatican decrees are slowly being shorn of their absolutism by "progressive interpretation" within the Roman Communion itself. Only the divine is immutable, and Vaticanism, being human, can be outgrown.

(f) These facts and inferences are consistent with the acknowledgment, abundantly justified, that *the Roman Primacy is of divine providence, and that its permanent continuance is involved therein*. The vital functions which that Primacy has fulfilled in the past—I cannot here elaborate upon them—and the obvious need of some central ecumenical machinery of permanent continuance for executive purposes and for Catholic unity, these point to such conclusion. But in no department of life does the providential status of a thing or institution exempt it from human corruption, criticism and reformation. That is involved in the laws of divine providence in all human affairs whatsoever.

(g) The continuance of the Roman Primacy in the future reunited Catholic Church, within properly safeguarded limits, seems indispensable. An effective substitute for it is nowhere available, and the creation of one by ecumenical consent is incredible. The requirements for reunion in this direction, therefore, do not include the abolition of Papal Primacy, but its reformation—its being constitutionalized in such wise as to prevent any return of autocracy, and to safeguard the paramount authority of the universal Church, Catholic liberties, and episcopal rights everywhere.

## II. PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

The Vatican Council declared that when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra* in teaching the universal Church concerning doctrine and morals he possesses the infallibility wherewith the divine

Redeemer has endowed His Church; and that such decisions are irreformable in themselves, apart from any subsequent assent of the Church. I am giving the substance rather than quoting literally, being away from my books.

It is pointed out by Roman writers that infallibility is here limited strictly to *ex cathedra* decisions, and does not apply to the Pope's personal views, otherwise expressed, nor even to official utterances that are not formally intended for the instruction of the universal Church in doctrines and morals. For example, various Roman writers deny that the Bull on Anglican Orders has to be taken as an *ex cathedra* and infallible decision. To this should be added that assertions of historic fact, outside the central facts of the dogmatic faith, are held not to be infallible. Finally, much is made of the presupposition that *ex cathedra* decisions do not come out of the blue, but represent previous careful enquiry into the mind of the universal Church—are in fact final registers of the results of such enquiry.

These qualifying explanations need to be remembered when we are assured by an eminent Roman apologist in England that the dogma of papal infallibility—of papal claims as asserted by the Vatican Council—is to be ranked with such a dogma as that of our Lord's true Godhead in being incapable of change, reduction or compromise. Again, I am not quoting literally.

(a) First of all we note that the question is not what Father Woodlock, just referred to, and other Roman theologians think as to the dogmatic rank of the assertion of papal infallibility, but whether in fact it has had such rank in the mind of the universal Church. The Romans agree with Anglicans in holding that nothing is *de fide* which has not been held, implicitly at least, by the whole Church from the beginning. The limits of this syllabus do not permit detailed discussion. It is enough to say, in the light of history, that when Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Satis Cognitum* declared, "In the decree of the Vatican Council . . . no newly conceived opinion is set forth, but the venerable and constant belief of every age," he revealed that fallibility which Romans acknowledge attends papal assertions of fact. That he as-



serted what is not so, is susceptible of overwhelming proof. The Vatican decree is supported by no ancient evidence, and is contradicted by the freedom with which contrary views were ventilated in the modern Roman Church until the Vatican Council and impending discipline suppressed such utterances in 1870.

(b) Again, the Vatican Council was not ecumenical either in representative membership or in subsequent acceptance of the universal Catholic Church. Neither the Orthodox Eastern nor the Anglican Churches had any part in it. They reject its decree absolutely. The Roman declares that the Churches referred to are cut off from the Catholic Church *ipso facto* because of their refusal of papal obedience, and therefore their non-participation in the Council, and non-acceptance of its decree is without significance *ad rem*. The answer is that to say so is to beg the question as to whether papal claims in their modern form are valid. Unless they are, submission to them cannot be taken as essential to the Catholic standing of the Churches mentioned. This is sufficiently determined by their uninterrupted retention of the faith, ministry and sacraments of the ancient Church.

(c) The machinery of *ex cathedra* infallible decisions by the Roman See has waited long for identification; and has not been the practical refuge in time of controversy which Roman apologists presuppose in arguments for its value and necessity. The greater questions which had to be settled by the ancient Church were determined by Ecumenical Councils, and even the Tome of St. Leo on the Incarnation was not ratified by the Council of Chalcedon until its language had been carefully examined and discussed. The instances of papal decisions generally admitted by Romans to be *ex cathedra* have been extraordinarily rare, considering the frequent need of the settlement of controversies which they are claimed to satisfy. The late Father Carson limits them to two—the Tome of St. Leo and the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX. The fact is that there is no infallible means of determining when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*; and therefore the Roman reply to attacks on the utterances of Zosimus and Honorius, that their erroneous language

was not *ex cathedra*, true though it seems to be, lacks persuasive power in the general argument on this subject.

(d) The infallibility which is claimed for the Pope in *ex cathedra* decisions is described by the Vatican Council as that wherewith the divine Redeemer willed to endow His Church. The question has to be answered, then, what sort of infallibility was so given to the Church. Was it infallibility in the Roman sense at all? We know that the Lord made two promises *in re*, that the Holy Spirit should guide the Church into all the truth, and that the gates of hades should not prevail against the Church. There was, however, no promise that the Church by virtue of the Spirit's guidance should be able in all emergencies to define the truth in exact and irreformable phrases. Certainly some of the Church's efforts to do this have failed, and its most normal machinery for enunciating dogma—General Councils—have in notable instances broken in its hands. Definitions are not multiplied by divine pedagogy. What the guidance of the Spirit secures is that *the faithful*—those who accept the Church's authority and loyally conform to its sacramental way of life—will securely obtain such knowledge of the truth as will bring them to eternal life. The ministrant of this security is the Church, and when *in divine judgment* dogmas are needed, the Church will be enabled rightly to set them forth. Otherwise, no machinery, *ex cathedra* or other, can do it. The Spirit's guidance is pledged to the Church, and that makes its loyal members secure; but the *method* of this guidance is not divinely declared. History shows that it has varied greatly; and that it is *centred* in the Church's prescribed "Way," rather than in formal pronouncements. In this "Way," embodied in what the Catholic Church everywhere prescribes in Liturgy, Sacrament and discipline, "the living voice" continues to proclaim uninterruptedly "the faith once for all delivered to the saints," in the concrete manner best understood by the simple. No system avails to guide the disloyal and sophisticated.

(e) The most central error of the infallibility decree is its substitution of the Pope for the Church in final definitions of

truth and morals. They are declared to be irreformable even by the universal Church. It is obvious, of course, that if the Pope successfully defines saving truth, that *truth* can be changed by no authority whatever. But to say that the *ex cathedra definitions* of truth made by the Roman See are irreformable of themselves, apart from subsequent Catholic consent, is to *transfer the Church's dogmatic office to the Pope*. The safeguard of corporate witness is then put in abeyance at a most critical moment. Who is to determine whether the Pope has spoken infallibly? Is it an Italianized and provincial curia?

### III. REQUIREMENTS FOR REUNION

The road to reunion according to Roman pronouncements is unqualified submission to the Roman See; and these pronouncements are beyond Catholic challenge if the claims of that See, as set forth in the Vatican decrees, are valid.

(a) The facts require us to acknowledge the general acceptance of a Roman primacy in the ancient Church, and that relevant history supports the belief that such primacy, permanently to be continued, is of providential ordering. It must be retained in the future reunited Church. But we Anglicans hold that the modern development of this Primacy into its present autocratic form is not of God's will. It infringes upon the divinely given jurisdiction of bishops, restricts various necessary Catholic liberties, and cannot be accepted by the Anglicans and Eastern Orthodox consistently with Catholic principles. For Catholic reunion it is necessary that the Roman Primacy should be reformed and restored to its original harmony with Catholic principles.

(b) It should be acknowledged that as a defender and promoter of Catholic truth and right the Roman See has a glorious record—in spite of such passing incidents as the vacillations of Liberius, Zosimus and Vigilius, the heretical attitude of Honorius, and the moral scandals of papal life and rule during the pornography of the tenth century and in the time of the Borgias. And the uncompromising stand of that See, with its vast following,

for the ancient faith has been a source of strength to Anglicans who are taking the same stand—a debt which we do not sufficiently realize. But we cannot reunite with Rome so long as the Roman See usurps the Church's dogmatic office and, as incidental to this, seeks to bind on all Christian consciences the acceptance of certain doctrines and practices which have the authority neither of Scripture nor of Catholic antiquity. The reunited Church must have the authority and *means* of overruling and rejecting the utterances of its Primate, if its God-given dogmatic office is to be preserved intact.

(c) It has been customary among Anglicans to coördinate with these obstacles to reunion with Rome, as separate and equally major problems, the mediaeval and modern accretions doctrinal and practical which the Roman Church claims to bind on all faithful Christians. It should be clear, however, that if the Vatican claims were abandoned or outgrown, these accretions would assume a very different aspect. They would at once be recognized as having provincial support only, and would gradually give way in the light of liberated intelligence and study. My purpose in this article does not, therefore, require their separate specification and consideration.

(d) Even the question of Anglican Orders will assume a new phase when the major premise lying back of their condemnation by Leo XIII is dismissed. I mean the assumption running through the Bull referred to that Catholic means Roman, so that a rite which Rome does not accept is non-Catholic and defective *ipso facto*, and one which does not express the Catholic intention in Rome's way of expressing it is defective in intention. Once this assumption is abandoned, as it will be when the Vatican claims are put aside, the evidence that our Edwardan Ordinal conformed to ancient Catholic requirements, and was ecclesiastically intended to continue the ancient Catholic hierarchy with its traditional functions, will become clear to all.

(e) Is it a credible supposition that some day the Vatican claims will cease to be maintained, whether by express abandonment or by being effectively outgrown? The assertion frequently

made that Rome cannot change its position can be made good only on the supposition that its position is divine—that the Vatican claim is true. Believing that it is not divine and true, Anglicans cannot consistently believe in its immutability. Moreover, the Vatican position patently is a development, and developments have a way of continuing—when illegitimate, of reversal. Rome can change, for she has been changing all through her history.

Three factors are now working for the destruction of Vaticanism: (1) The immense increase in the cosmopolitan interchange of knowledge and ideas in every direction is leaving the Roman communion with forms of thought that are visibly liberalizing Roman literature and making the anomalous character of the papal rule conspicuous. It must ultimately bring the papal claims into the limelight of fresh study. (2) Divine providence in a world which is being revolutionized has to be reckoned with. All ideas are being considered in new perspectives, and no invalid contention or claim can hold its own permanently. (3) The element of time has to be reckoned with, and time "bears all its sons away." "The mills of God grind slowly"—but surely.

Of course, the real ground of optimism in this matter is belief that God wills the reunion of His Church, and therefore wills, and in time will bring about, the removal of the chief obstacle.

#### POSTSCRIPT: THE WORLD CONFERENCE

Since the above was written the World Conference has met in Lausanne, Switzerland—August 3-21—and some notice of it will perhaps be a fitting close to my series of articles on Reunion.

The aim of this Conference, as stipulated in the original proposal of the General Convention of 1910, was to promote mutual understanding by "the clear statement and full consideration of those things in which we differ, as well as of those things in which we are at one"—"a Conference for the purpose of study and discussion, without power to legislate or to adopt resolutions"—this being declared to be "the next step toward unity."

Three steps appear to be necessary before the "unity" referred to—the union of Catholic and Protestant Christendom in one visible body—can be brought about with hope of permanence and of conformity therein to the will of Christ for His Church. *The first* is removal of the mutual misunderstandings and bitterness that centuries of separation and controversy have created and crystallized in diverse terminologies and institutional embodiments. *The*

*second* is a fresh and common study—necessarily prolonged—of the questions of Faith and Order involved, undertaken in a new spirit of friendliness, and with prayerful determination to recover the full Faith and Order which Christ and His Apostles revealed and permanently instituted for the Church. *The third* is the attainment through such study, and by divine grace, of such common recognition and acceptance of this Faith and Order as will make possible a corporate reunion under one sacred ministry and sacramental discipline which will neither jeopardize anything divinely revealed and appointed nor again bring in schism-provoking abuses. Only then can *external* steps be taken toward reunion between Catholic and Protestant Communions without weakening spiritual discipline, distressing the faithful, and setting back the cause of full Christian unity.

It is true that numerous Christian bodies are sufficiently agreed to unite in the near future without subversion of their existing beliefs and practices. But such unions leave unsolved the wider problems of the reunion of Christendom, at large; and they do not necessarily secure that acceptance of the primitive Christian Faith and Order upon which world-wide unity depends.

The World Conference was undertaken in the interest of ultimate, world-wide Christian reunion, and was carefully limited in its scope to the first of the three steps preparatory for such union which I have here endeavoured to distinguish—that of clearing away the mutual misapprehensions which hamper a common recovery by all of the mind and purpose of Jesus Christ for His Church. No participant was expected to commit himself to previously unaccepted convictions; and the somewhat wide-spread impression that the Conference was designed to create and publish to the world an impressive series of agreements—sufficient, perhaps, to justify active steps toward reunion in the near future—was quite astray. It was no doubt shared by prominent promoters of the Conference, and threatened at one time to imperil its original purpose, thereby bringing the whole plan under suspicion in some quarters, as compromising. Happily such fears were not justified by the outcome. The Rules of Procedure were modified so as to require the study and report of *differences* as well as agreements; and, for further protection against misleading committals, the Reports transmitted to the Churches were ordered to be described as “received” instead of as “accepted” or “adopted.” In brief, the Conference rapidly developed a clear understanding of its real purpose, and in a most friendly and splendid temper devoted itself to studying the real situation, the actual agreements *and differences*. Illusory and unreal agreements were shunned.

Accordingly, the Conference was wonderfully successful—that is, in its appointed undertaking. Seven subjects were handled: 1. The Call to Unity; 2. The Church's Message to the World—the Gospel; 3. The Nature of the Church; 4. The Church's Common Confession of Faith; 5. The Church's Ministry; 6. The Sacraments; 7. The Unity of Christendom and the Relation thereto of existing Churches. Each was *first* presented to the whole Conference by representative speakers; *then*, more intimately handled by sections into which the Conference was divided, the sections each containing representatives



of all the chief Christian standpoints; *thirdly*, these sections made Reports of both agreements and differences to the full Conference, where they were freely discussed, amendments offered, and then referred to a Drafting Committee. *Finally*, the Reports as amended were "received"—not "adopted"—for transmission to "the Churches." All the Reports were "received" unanimously except that on Subject VII, which could not be whipped into generally pleasing shape within the time available. It was indeed "received," but for reference to the Continuation Committee, not for transmission to the Churches.

The difficulties overcome were great. Three languages—English, French and German—were spoken, and each speech had to be translated into two other languages. The time limit for the bulk of the speeches was 10 minutes—5 to 7 for speaking and 3 to 5 for interpreting. And it worked with astonishing smoothness. Every standpoint was fully heard. In particular, the Orthodox Easterns were very effective, adding a separate statement of their position as a whole, duly "received." The Anglicans were in much evidence, and Anglo-Catholicism emerged in a most definite and effective way. The Lutherans, Presbyterians, Congregationalists and others had their innings, and talked straight. The Reports, of course, fail to reveal the very great success of the sectional give and take—the freedom from reserve, the splendid listening temper and all. The spirit of compromise was simply absent, frank and friendly explanation of positions, with patient attention, taking its place.

Mention should be added in conclusion of two inspiring things. First, the development of friendships, based upon candour and mutual respect. Secondly, the devotional side, emphasized by frequent vocal prayer and song, with occasional one-minute silences for devotion. Each session was introduced by a well-attended half hour of devotional exercises. Alas, there could be no corporate communion! We all understood that. But we got very near each other, and I for one will never forget the experience.

A large and representative Continuation Committee has been elected to carry on the work, and further Conferences will no doubt be planned. The success of that at Lausanne lies in what it has initiated, not in what it has completed—in friendly studies gotten under way, not in conclusions reached.

FRANCIS J. HALL

*Lausanne, August 26, 1927*

## KARL BARTH AND THE BARTHIAN MOVEMENT

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"Neither went I up to Jerusalem to them that were apostles before me: but I went away into Arabia" (Gal. 1:17) heads the preface of Barth's second edition of his main work, *The Epistle to the Romans*. And with these words Barth gives us to understand that, like Paul, he wants to keep independent of tradition and authority. And yet he is not erratic; he claims even a very impressive succession of prophets for his ancestry. From Kierkegaard, the Danish pastor and writer in the nineteenth century to Luther and Calvin, from the Reformers straight to Paul and Jeremiah. To these he adds Plato and Kant as his masters in philosophy. From a personal knowledge of his life we may well add the Blumhardts, father and son, of Bad Boll in Württemberg, strange prophets in the German Protestant world of the last century, more concerned with and more expectant of the real, eschatological powers of God breaking through into this world, than with our movement toward God in the religiosity of worship and preaching. Away from the Lutheran double track of a sanctified inner life justified by faith and an unredeemable outer life which could at best be *eine Ordnung der Sünde*, the Blumhardts preached God's victorious power to redeem and transfigure the whole of this world. Kutter and Ragaz, the two Swiss leaders of a new "religious-social" movement, received their inspiration in Bad Boll. Kutter, until recently pastor of the Zwinglian National Church in Zurich, was a forerunner of both Barth and Rudolf Otto in his book *Das Unmittelbare*; Ragaz, late Professor of Systematic Theology in Zurich, going more into the political field, a friend of Kier Hardie and Rauschenbusch, was an impressive prophet of Old Testament calibre, preaching his Gospel of social righteousness with unflinching

courage. This world was declared to be ready for the Kingdom of God; the labour movement, whatever its materialistic ideology might be, was depicted as the one real, concrete, actual force of God in history making for the coming of the Kingdom; the pharisaic, self-satisfied, bourgeois Church sanctioning the capitalistic order, was felt to be the main anti-Christian stumbling-block. Ministers in the Church, members of the Swiss Social-democratic party, Kutter and Ragaz showed extraordinary freedom. They did not believe in socialistic and communistic utopias. Only the criticism of Marxism with reference to capitalism, its "No" to this world, seemed to them to be religiously relevant. However, driven by the war events to more categorical and massive assertions, the temptation of absolute and one-sided identification was very near. Could one really venture to say that a split-up socialism, whether for democracy and reform, or for dictatorship and revolution, was of God, or on the other hand, could one say it of the Wilsonian pacifistic Covenant legality? For years the reality of God in those historic forces had been preached. Where were they now?

The Religious Socialist Movement was not theology of scholarly type; it was living prophecy. It swept the Swiss universities in recent decades, and spread from the more favorable Zwinglian-Calvinistic and democratic Swiss soil into Lutheran Germany. Barth and his friend Thurneysen were young theologians and members of the movement with a large group of friends all over Switzerland. In many hot discussions during the war pre-Barthianism loomed on the horizon as a "religious-social" viewpoint against Ragaz' aggressive vindication of immediate political action. Barth in the little village of Safenwil was preaching every Sunday to his peasant congregation. One could hear the thunder of the guns in the battle in nearby Alsace. This was the atmosphere in which Barth finished the *Epistle to the Romans* in the summer of 1918, while the war was still on. It was meant to be a word of self-reflection and a word to his friends in the movement. It was a word of warning against any new idolatry,

any new unholy mixing together of what belongs to God and what belongs to men.

## I

What is this Commentary on the Romans? The title is misleading. It is not a further contribution, a "still other" viewpoint in the ocean of present-day scientific exegesis. It has nothing of the cleverness of modern scholarship. It does not analyze philologically, it has nothing to do with nice calculations of historic probability, it does not measure with psychological laws, nor with the rules of pure logic. It is strangely archaic, old-fashioned, and very hard reading. It has no conventional sequence, is full of strange paradoxes. It states, as if it had not stated. It posits only to negate on the next page. *Fasse es, wer's fassen kann*, "Try to get it, if you can" says the author repeatedly, as an encouragement he obviously thinks you need. His writing can best be compared with an impressionistic wood-cut in black and white, all the laws of classical perspective thrown away, everything strangely distorted, curved and stretched, and yet the whole undoubtedly expressing something very real and powerful. Barth in his essay, "The Word of God as the task of theology,"<sup>1</sup> discerns three methods in theology; the traditional dogmatic method, giving you a clear-cut human statement about God and saying: "Here is the divine truth, believe in it"; then the critical method of mystical negative theology, "where the movement of God to man is so powerful that man is seemingly annihilated, negated away;" and finally the dialectical method, the method of Paul and the Reformation. This last contains, in its premises, all the truth of both the dogmatical and the critical way, but recognizes their ultimate relativity. Both the positive action of God toward men and the criticism of men are true. According to Barth the *via media et divina* out of which both flow is the not perceivable "Wholly Other." The dialectician walks on a mountain crest, the chasm of mere negative criticism on one side, of mere one-sided dogmatic positing on the other.

<sup>1</sup> "Gottes Wort als Aufgabe der Theologie," p. 164, in a series of papers called *Gottes Wort in der Theologie* (Kaiser, München, 1924.)

If you stand still, you fall. And going means stating, as if you had not stated, negating, as if you had not negated. Positing and negating are constantly referred to one another. No rigid "No," no rigid "Yes." Speaking of God's glory in creation, but only in memory of the eighth chapter of Romans, emphasizing the fact that God in nature is wholly invisible for our eyes. Speaking of death and the ultimate passing away of all things in this world, but keeping in mind the majesty of the "wholly other" life, we just begin in dying. Speaking of man as the image of God, but insisting that the man we know is a fallen man, whose need and misery we know better than his glory. Speaking of sin, yes, but with the certitude, that we can only know what sin is, when it is forgiven us. What it really means that God makes men righteous, we cannot explain with other words than Luther's, the *justificatio impii*. The *impius*, when he hears and understands that he is an *impius* and nothing else, knows that just because of this he is justified, a *iustus* before God.<sup>2</sup>

*Der Römerbrief* is an old-fashioned book with a total unconcern for modern psychological, historical, critical scholarship. Is Barth a Fundamentalist? Does his going back to the Reformation mean back to post-Reformation supernatural rationalism? By no means. He does not believe in verbal inspiration. The Bible for him is a human document like any other. It can make no pretense to dogmatic infallibility. Is it a mere collection of literary writings of a tribal religion in the Near East, of a soteriological religion in the Hellenistic period? Most certainly.<sup>3</sup> Perfect freedom for all forms of scientific investigation must be insisted upon. Let us have all the shades of scientific criticism. But what of it? Human scientific knowledge about a human document shows you historical facts, psychological facts, a set of moral teachings. But it is not *Theology*, the Logos of and about God. Theology begins where these human investigations must

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> "Biblische Fragen, Einsichten, Ausblicke," in *Gottes Wort in der Theol.*, p. 70.

stop, where the Bible becomes, out of a collection of undoubtedly very interesting facts, a testimony of God. "Its task is not to analyze paper and color," as Kutter said once, "but to see the biblical image." And Barth declares: "We do not see God with our own eyes but from the prophets down these people in the Bible are like the folks on the street, all looking oddly into the sky, necks bent, faces turned upward. As we look out of a window, we do not see with our eyes what they see, but we know they must see something. What they see is that which is beyond the mere human, beyond mere history."<sup>4</sup> Not a merely given God, metaphysically well defined, but the God the Bible itself can only see in a dialectical way. The God of "At the beginning God created Heaven and Earth" and "Amen, O Lord, come"; Creator and Saviour, Beginning and End, Origin and Goal, in whom we are grounded and toward whom we strive. Containing all this, the Bible is nevertheless not a more than human document, and yet it bears testimony to God's all-sufficient answer to men. In the words of the Bible is the word of God. Those who know how to hear, hear it. And if it is the word of God, then it is not merely upon the historical plane. God and truth are not historical categories. The word is spoken to us with the same power as to Israel. The Bible is a historical frame for a meta-historical revelation of God. It hints at that which is beyond, at that which transcends all that is given in this world. It testifies of that which is beyond, acting and revealing itself in this world.

This is what Barth, Brunner and others have called the true biblicism of the Reformation. God is in Heaven, we have to live upon the earth: this is the theme of the Bible, the subject of theology, and ultimately of philosophy.<sup>5</sup> There is no longer any clear-cut division between theology and philosophy. Theology does not work with mere pragmatic value-judgments; the categories right and wrong, true and false are theological categories.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>5</sup> Preface to the second edition of the *Römerbrief*, pp. x, xiii. Quotations are from the 4th edition (Kaiser, München, 1924).



Faith is knowing the truth, willing the right, and feeling dependence all at the same time; indeed, it is all of this and yet beyond all of this. The claim that it is theology's task to think the Word of God, the attempts to vindicate its right to do so, and the postulate of the possibility of finding God's truth and expressing it in thoughts, constitute what has often been called the intellectualism of the Barthian movement. Barth promises to be, in his *Epistle to the Romans*, a turning point in theological thought, as Schleiermacher was with his *Speeches*. From a self-sufficient speculative, rational philosophy of the Hegelian type, religion had fled into the sphere of the emotional, the irrational, sometimes the pragmatic and social. Now theology starts a counter-attack against philosophy in its secularized form. Theology cannot live without metaphysical statements about a transcendent God. The paradox of all paradoxes is to make that which stands beyond the subject and the object, an object of our thought.<sup>6</sup> God not as the *demonstrandum*, but as the *demonstrans*, not as the one who has to be deduced, reasoned out, constructed, but as the one through whom we deduce, who is the reason of our reasoning and the architect of our construction.<sup>7</sup> We do not think Him out, we think *after* Him, according to Him. We try to think *His* thought, not according to our human logic, but according to His logos, theo-logos, not an abstract speculation, but His actual revelation to His creation, His love in our need and helplessness. We attempt to stammer with our words His plan of salvation, His revelation to us.

## II

What is Barth's God? What is Barth's world? Much of Calvin's *majestas* and *mysterium tremendum* can be found in Barth. A chasm, an empty space separates us from God, a distance beyond all human measure is between "us others" and God, the "Wholly Other." We, "the others," have to live in a cosmos ruled by the laws of inorganic matter and organic life, a cosmos in time and space possessed by a mysterious *élan vital*, an

<sup>6</sup> Paul Tillich in *Kant-Studien*, Vol. XXVII, p. 446 (1922).

<sup>7</sup> Brunner, *Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube*, p. 79 (Mohr, Tübingen, 1922).

erotic libido and a will to power, expressed in various ways from coarse sexual perversion and acts of crude domineering down to a subtle, irrational erotic mysticism, and the modern abstract forms of economic control in capitalism and imperialism. In literature we find it all the way from Job to Dostoevsky—the latter might well be added to Barth's genealogy—a strange vision of the final *telos*, the final goal of this world which is death, destruction. The vision of a tremendous dark shadow hovers over this mysterious world. The most admirable human achievements in art, in science, in true moral life, are all threatened by an ultimate un-sureness. A secret and most disquieting question mark is to be put behind all those good and worthy things. A strange and inexplicable unrest persists in us. The moral hero is no better than the criminal, the wise expert no better off than a dumb ignorant Russian moujik—perhaps even worse off.

And against this world, passionately living, desperately seeking to escape from death, there stands God's world, the world of life eternal in radical antinomy and polarity toward our world, in perpetual tension with our world. Against the "this and that" of our existence, the "wholly other"; against the relative, the absolute; against all mere existence, the reason of existence; against all that of which we may become aware, that of which we are not aware; against all the "Here" the unmeasurable "There," against all that is created and therefore hungry for salvation, the Kingdom of Creation and Salvation; against the passing world, the world that is eternally, the Alpha and Omega of our existence. But, let us say it at the outset, these predicates are *not* mere predicates besides others. They are not categories amongst others. If God is the ultimate Cause, this is not in the sense of a prolongation of a causal line from this world of time and space into the other. Creation and the fall of men are truly *meta*-physical, *meta*-historical, transcendental events. Again and again Barth repeats and hammers it into us: the other world, the new world can, from our side, only be conceived through the category of the impossible.<sup>8</sup> There is no continuity between

<sup>8</sup> Barth, *Römerbrief*, p. 189.

them, no progress, no evolutionary bridge from the one to the other, to the wholly new, the "wholly other." Our world is finite, limited. God begins beyond; where our possibilities cease, God's possibility begins. To know the boundary lines is to know that there is a beyond. God is the impossible made possible, the scandal to us, to our science and the laws of our world; He is the wonder *kat' exochên*. He is the question mark behind all things of this finite order; He says "Impossible" to all *our* possibilities. We yearn and crave to have His impossible become possible. All things in this world are strangely related to *His* possibility. Only His impossible and yet possible possibility gives the world meaning, sense and order. God penetrates the finite order as a vertical arrow piercing straight down through all our human categories.<sup>9</sup> The Kingdom of God, the divine possibility, is a *futurum æternum* in *our* world, a non-historical last hour. Every hour is a last hour. Every time stands at the edge of all that is embedded in time; every time is penetrated by this arrow from above, piercing through; every time cries helplessly for the "wholly other," the wholly transcendent God. True religion is always eschatological. Our quest for God is always a quest out of despair, at best *de profundis*, at best a cry, "O God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" We ourselves are without salvation, we crave to confess our sins and to be judged, in order to be forgiven and saved by God's grace. We are condemned to die. There is no bridge from us to Him. There is only one way from Him to us. To think about God is to relate all that *we* are to Him. This is true eschatology, true late-hour wisdom. In doing so we enter the crisis, we face the divine dilemma, the divine paradox, God's "No" to us, His judgment upon us, in order that we may hear his "Yes" to us, the gracious "Yes" of His redemption, the revelation of that which is eternally for us an impossible possibility.

### III

Let us pause here. Barth's theology has been called the theology of crisis, and, indeed, the idea of what he calls crisis is at

<sup>9</sup> "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft" in *Gottes Wort in der Theol.*, p. 42.

the very heart of his whole thought. I say thought and not theory or system, for Barth emphatically denies the attempt to build up a theology competing with others. His is merely a suggestion to you, liberals, radicals, fundamentalists, a hint along the line, "What, if it were this way or that way?," a question mark behind your own assertions, a warning, a corrective to your positiveness. Now, then, the best we can say from our side about God is that we are in the crisis, upon trial before God. Does he mean a religious, a Christian criticism of the world of to-day? By no means. This is not the human thing called religion criticising other human phenomena, science, art, the social order and the like. The crisis is not a horizontal human affair, not even a religious one. The crisis is truly the arrow piercing through, straight from above. And hitting religion first of all, as the most dangerous, because the most presumptuous of all human possibilities. For religion, the religion of the truly pious, is an attempt to go directly to God, man's jumping board into the "wholly other" world. A jumping board for a jump which has, is, and will be for ever and ever an appalling failure.<sup>10</sup> Of all our human possibilities there is none which shows so clearly the vacuum, the unbridgeable chasm between God and his creation. Truly, religion is the very geometric point where we become aware of this impassable gulf. It is the point where, at best, the crisis begins. It is also the point which, at worst, keeps us from coming into the crisis. Keeping in the line of the Old Testament prophets and Paul, Barth reopens an attack on religionism and religionistic conceptions of God. What is religion at best, asks Barth, but the attempt to get an impression of God's revelation and to conserve it, a mere glimpse, so to say, something telling us that God is not here, that he has merely left us a photographic negative? Or the divine light, but broken in a human prism, and therefore entirely different from the original beam. A truly human function, yes, bearer of something super-human, yet clad in human categories, almost swallowed up in hu-

<sup>10</sup> See especially *Römerbrief*, pp. 211-253; also "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft" and "Gottes Wort als Aufgabe der Theologie."

man feelings, human morals, human thought, human symbols, human legends. Between the religious pathos and the moral, intellectual, esthetic, erotic enthusiasm there is only a difference in grade—a smoke-cloud beside other smoke and steam-clouds above the vast field of humanity—a human, merely human passion more, though crowned with the pathos of the infinite,<sup>11</sup> truly the climax of humanity, but precisely as such sharing all the problematical character of things human, carrying the little question mark, the little disquieting question mark in the trail of prayers of adoration and hymns of praise.

In short, religion is an attempt to escape from sin, and is just the place where man has committed the sin of sins. This is the sense of the myth of the Temptation in Paradise. There happens what is of all possible evils the worst, man wanting to usurp God's place. To steal for himself that which belongs to God and God alone. To be a God himself in pride and self-sufficiency, *Eritis sicut deus* of Genesis.<sup>12</sup> This is what Barth calls Promethean Titanism,<sup>13</sup> the unheard of *hybris*, to steal God's immanence and then be free from Him. Where man reaches out over the false bridge he is thrown back into his own world. This world becomes now a sinful world, man's distance from God becomes isolation from him. The crisis breaks out, Titanism is on trial. Thus even at best religion is not the divine music accompanying our acts, thoughts and feeling, as Schleiermacher has described it, but the place where danger begins, the place where humanity becomes greatly disturbed, where our harmony breaks into sharp disharmony. Thus religion not a friend, but an enemy, not a saviour, but that which tells us of our not being saved. Religion is not the peaceful dwelling place of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, but the most uncomfortable battlefield of the scandalous with our wisdom, of death and sin, of devil and hell. Real religion is the cry of despair and dismay of man before his own

<sup>11</sup> *Römerbrief*, p. 218.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 266, 420. One of the fundamental categories of Barth's thinking.

self.<sup>14</sup> Here is the testimony of the great apostle himself, even after Damascus: "Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" This is religion on trial, religion dying before God. But the more the most dangerous species of mankind, as Barth calls him, the more the *homo religiosus* is lulled to sleep in his own piety and fervor, the worse it is for him. Somehow, good and pious churches are more endangered than sinful ones. Where religion becomes an end in itself, becomes absolute, there it is the greatest and most damnable stumbling-block between ourselves and God. Not in vain do we imagine the most perverse and hidden Satanic forces as the Antichrist.

#### IV

Sacrilegious Titanism and identification of merely human things with God are always found together. In the field of religion itself, in the Church, our own piety, our own craving for God is identified with God himself. We push God away and enshrine our own religiosity and begin to worship before it. Whether it is the rather crude materialization in legalistic dogma and magical sacramentalism or the more subtle forms of romantic immanence-piety, the modern cult of the irrational *élan vital*, pantheistic mysticism clad in a rational and scientific world-outlook, revolutionary idealism identifying God with the cause of communism or pacifism, or the movement of youth "as such," democracy "as such," nationalism "as such," it is just the same. Barth is the prophet of the big downfall of idols in post-war Europe.

Let us, then, admit that the best we can do is to go into the crisis, to go on trial before God. We hear His indictment, His "No" to us, we see the chasm between ourselves and His divine majesty, we are thrown back where we belong. Truly, a desperate situation. Is there no answer, no way out? Is this radical dualism final? *Gott im Himmel und Du auf die Erde angewiesen*, "God in Heaven and you compelled to live upon the

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, especially pp. 222-239.



earth," repeats Barth again and again. Yet, in spite of it, there is a way out, though no way from us to God. There is only a way from God to the world, and this way is Jesus Christ.<sup>15</sup> He is the liberating word religion cannot find, the solution to the question we cannot answer, the suspension of our condemnation to death which religion could merely confirm. He is the revelation of that righteousness of God which, in religion, is always sought but never found. "Religion" is, indeed, in the very specific sense in which Barth uses the term, namely as a merely human phenomenon, the most dreadful human possibility. With such a religion Christ has nothing to do. He is the overcoming of it, "the end of the law unto righteousness." Christ is the *one* step over the border-line of the old world into the new, from our side impossible, the actualization of that which no religion can make actual.<sup>16</sup>

How does Barth relate this Christ, this meta-historical revelation of God, to the historic Jesus? For him the Jesus of the records, insofar as he walks in the historical and psychological plane, partakes of the lack of plasticity, of the vagueness of all things past. He is, in his external manifestation, irrelevant and a problem. This is what has left freedom for the most sublime and the most absurd "Lives of Jesus," in which especially the nineteenth century indulged. A figure which is no genius, no colossal image of strength, endowed with occult psychic forces, and still in no way the current ideal of the healthy, normal, reasonable, religious man. He is in absolute contrast to the idea of a glorious Son of God.<sup>17</sup> . . . Almost unrecognizable in his incognito in the flesh, a paradox, a scandal, an absurd and ridiculous wandering preacher, a conspicuous failure. In the plane of history we understand him less and less, up to the Cross. All our

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, especially pp. 66-81. See also "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft" and "Not und Verheissung der christlichen Verkündigung" in *Gottes Wort in der Theologie*.

<sup>16</sup> *Römerbrief*, pp. 252, 254-269. See also "Biblische Fragen, Einsichten, Ausblicke" in *Gottes Wort in der Theol.*

<sup>17</sup> *Römerbrief*, pp. 262, 264; "Bibl. Fragen, etc." in *Gottes Wort in der Theol.*, pp. 86 ff.

attempts to describe psychologically what happened within him are a hopeless failure, evident distortions. Not the historic, scientifically correct data about the man Jesus shakes the world, but Paul's classic summing up of the tradition in the Gospel of the crucified and risen Lord. Barth likes to quote 2 Cor. 5:16, "Wherefore we henceforth know no man after the flesh: even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know him so no more." For even the mere historic fact of his sacrificial death does not mean any more or any less than the countless heroic sacrifices of life of others, Socrates, many martyrs, mothers dying for their children, soldiers at their post, missionaries in epidemics. No, what concerns us, is that which is said through that death of the historic Jesus, God's answer to us, a final word of God revealed to us, God's fundamental negation of man in the Cross, the judgment upon the totality of all human possibilities, especially the religious possibility; the hero, the prophet, the miracle-worker dies, in order that the Son of God may live. At the cross God's radical, all-inclusive authority over men has its triumph, God reveals Himself as God, as true sovereign—"despot," says the Greek text. Christ's death is a demonstration of the relativity of all human things, of all human values. They become non-existent before God. God is revealed in the Cross as the beginning and the end. And the end of man is the beginning of God. Negating man, God posits Himself and in doing so reveals life eternal for us.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, what matters are not details about the vague historic Jesus, but the meaning framed in the historic phenomenon, the meta-historical relation of Christ to his origin in God. And just as well as in the historic death on the Cross we perceive God in action, we become aware of Him in the meta-historical fact of the Resurrection.<sup>19</sup> An unhistorical event *kat' exochên*, Barth

<sup>18</sup> *Römerbrief*, esp. pp. 170-180. See also "Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart" in *Gottes W. in der Theol.*, pp. 154, 155.

<sup>19</sup> On resurrection esp. *Römerbrief*, pp. 77-81, 167-187; "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft," pp. 66 ff.; "Bibl. Fragen, etc.," pp. 88 ff.—both in *Gottes W. in der Theol.* See also "Die Auferstehung von den Toten" (Kaiser, München, 1924).

calls it. The empty tomb is a scandal for us, utterly incomprehensible for our thought. What the records show us are merely the borderlines, the edges where our history ceases, the human line around the empty space, the limit of human history. The Resurrection is beyond, it is the revelation of the other world in this world, the new world, Christ the new man, the hint at the fulfillment of all things, the eschatological wonder, eternity breaking into the time-order. We may only see that something has happened, the continuity of time is broken; the Bible merely records the broken edges of our time, a negative record of what broke through. Looking at it with the eyes of faith we hear suddenly the word about all things which shall be made new in him, a new heaven and a new earth. A forgiving "Yes" of God to men, as final as His former "No." The day of wrath of the Crucifixion is identical with God's redeeming act of love. In Christ we have God's unique transcendence and contingency as well as God's ontological existence and eternity. Christ is for the Barthians neither a figure of history to which we try to discover some relatedness, nor a supernatural wonder; neither an object for religious and mystical experiences, nor the crowning stone on a fine structure of pure thought. "Get it, if you can," Christ the unheard-of objective truth beyond all our human and humanistic border-lines.

## V

What matters, then, is always, first and foremost God's movement toward us. Out of this *mysterium tremendum*, out of the utterly transcendent God, Calvin's majestic God, Luther's *deus absconditus*, out of the "Wholly Other" to whom and for whom Barth sings anew such an impressive *solī Deo gloria*, the arrow of revelation, straight from above, through the inconspicuous man of Nazareth cuts through all our life, opens it, shakes it, all our emotions, all our humanity, all our achievements, but first of all our religiosity itself. We stand with awe before the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. Nothing is more impossible to us, and yet nothing is more *for us* than the revelation of the new men

and the new world in the Resurrection. The synoptic records of Christ's life breathe resurrection, *spirant resurrectionem* [Bengel]. But the time of the *mysterium tremendum* which is mystery and mystery only is gone; yes, we do well to hide our faces in awe, but we are called upon for more than awe, we are called to see and to know, we are called to say "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done."<sup>20</sup> The "Yes" of God to us can be heard by us, we stand under trial, but we stand open to His grace and mercy too. Faith is the response to revelation, our only response. Calvin's *solī Deo gloria* finds an echo in Luther's *sola fide*. Faith is the human paradox in answer to God's paradox, it is the leap into the impossible, the mere negation of ourselves which brings a position, the only position upon which we may live.<sup>21</sup> We are not only what we are, we are through faith what we are not. There is a *credo quia absurdum* and a *credo ut intelligam* in every act of faith. An act transcending all categories of psychology and of mere cognition. The *actus activissimus* and yet "it happens with us;" we are "taken hold of." The act of unconditioned obedience, "Thou art," not "I am;" "Thy will be done;" "Give me thy name, so that I may glorify Thee." It is our recognizing the borderline, our stopping before God's holiness, our "Yes" to His "No." It is saying "In spite of" with God, as He forgives us in spite of Golgotha. Faith is not piety, piety is at best a valuable process making place for faith. Any faith which will be more than preëmpting ourselves is not faith any more. Faith is a leap into the emptiness with no hope for us, no reward for us. It is beyond any human achievement of asceticism, of mystical training. Something which never becomes a method, which is God's and God's only. No *unio mystica*, no *fruitio dei*, no immanent salvation. A place where the righteous and the just are strangely near to crooks and prostitutes. A leap truly *de profundis*. But he who makes the leap gets a foot on the rock beyond, he feels suddenly the strong hand of the judg-

<sup>20</sup> "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft" in *G. W. in der Theol.*, pp. 43, 41.

<sup>21</sup> On faith see *Römerbrief*, pp. 14-17, 90-141. See also E. Brunner, *Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube* and *Die Mystik und das Wort* (Mohr, Tübingen, 1924), pp. 79-205, 206-228.

ing and now loving God. Thus man who is always rejected by God can always be elected by him. He becomes a *iustus impius*, he is condemned and acquitted at the same time, a godless holy man. This is the paradox of faith.

## VI

Now that we have heard, if not God's, then at least Barth's "No" to us theologians, religious men, church folks and Christian workers, let us have a glimpse of what he has to say to the rest of the world, to history, to society, to culture with its science, its ethics and its laws.<sup>22</sup>

We, the religious men, have sinned through our forefathers in the marvelous program of the *omnia instaurare in Christo*. The Catholic Church became the temple of sacrilegious religionism, the self-sufficient body having God, not "as if it had not" under God's radical "No," but having God for good, having God unconditionally in sacraments and dogmas, absolutizing what is relative and attempting to control, to clericalize the world in the name of a God whose right to judge it denied. Then happened the other human attempt. Man took salvation in his own hands and tried to build the world without God. The false Catholic theonomy gave way to autonomy, the great process of secularization began. The failure to christianize the world led to its subtle paganization. The natural and merely natural laws began to rule the world. The state, the law, the social class, the fabric of economics, science, art, philosophy down to religion itself took their own, began to live by their own.<sup>23</sup> They all drift apart, self-satisfied; from time to time they crash together, and sometimes the crash takes gigantic and rather disquieting proportions, as in the last years, so that even the most inveterate worshipper of progress, evolution and science begins to lose his unshakable cultural optimism and feels a chill creep down his spine.

<sup>22</sup> Especially *Römerbrief*, pp. 410-424, and "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft"; also, "Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart."

<sup>23</sup> "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft," pp. 38, 44-47; "Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart," pp. 130 ff.—both in *Gottes Wort in der Theol.*

"Why can we not any more walk triumphantly into the Kingdom of God," asks Barth, "in the glorious sunshine of humanism, on two legs, with two hands and two eyes, but at best lame, crippled, half-blinded, demoralized, abased and humbled? Indeed, why can only the little bourgeois be satisfied and self-satisfied? And why, whatever arguments we may have before the final ones, why are we forced to admit the protest of a Kierkegaard against marriage and the family, of a Tolstoy against the State, culture and art, of an Ibsen against our tested morality, of a Kutter against the Church, a Nietzsche against Christianity as such, the protest of socialism and labour against the whole body of society, intellectual and material? Why haven't we the strength any more to protest pathetically against the unheard-of daring of a Dostoievsky, who lets the Savior walk as an idiot through society and who goes to harlots and murderers to find the true vision of Christ? Why is there something in us which acclaims the radical protest which the mysticism of the Middle Ages, the original Reformation, the Anabaptists, launch against that religion which seems to be within our society the only possible one?"<sup>24</sup>

We cannot help seeing this world *sub specie mortis*. The very emptiness, godlessness of the world reminds us of God, the Creator and Saviour. In looking at His creation we cannot but cry for His salvation. God's "No" cuts through the whole world, He is the ultimate relativation of all those worldly entities of our civilization. Only through His "No," in reference to Him, can we see what the world is meant to be. We cannot idealize any more, we cannot go back to innocent and incorruptible natural and primitive stages, as Rousseau wanted us to do. We cannot repeat the smiling "Yes" of a Goethe, nor lose ourselves in Tolstoy's "No." We can see the world only through the *complexio oppositorum* of "Yes" and "No." Our attitude is equally distant from mere otherworldly world-negation as it is from mere this-worldly world-affirmation; ours is the "fundamentally broken attitude" of Luther and Dostoievsky, the one which is broken by the Resurrection.

What, then, shall we do? And we ask a "What?" which includes all we may do, individually and collectively, whatever future history may determine. And in this "What?" we place ourselves before God Himself. Have we not prayed, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven"? We cannot choose, we have to ask; we put ourselves into the hands of the living God,

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.



we declare ourselves to be His servants. How otherwise then can we ask this question than by taking it upon ourselves to die? We do not ask a "What?" which can be satisfied with an easy "This and That," we mean the only possible, the eternal "What?" But this "What?" becomes the absolute attack of God upon man. And this attack means that all foggy dreams of human moral personality, all our own marvelous structures of morality, all the world of autonomous and independent human ethics are over. It means that the whole circus in which especially moral humanity likes to display itself, is for ever called off. It means that from the height where God is, all our human hills where well-intentioned schoolmasters moralize, where true and false prophets throw their thunderbolts, where true and imaginary martyrs pronounce their "Woe unto you," are not any more possible. It hits the Foerster and Ragaz (the Swiss Rauschenbusch) as well as the Lenin, the Ludendorff type, the righteous in the early Church as well as the human pigs of Dostoievsky's *Brothers Karamazov*,<sup>25</sup> the "What are we to do?," if it is a "What?" before God, is the ultimate condemnation of any morality. Man meets his own inability, he meets his condemnation to death, the noble and ideal man together with the beastly, crooked and perverse. The dividing-line is not between good and bad, but between God and man. No human "Thou oughtest" can be an answer to the "What?" but merely God's forgiveness of sins. If shocking things happen just here, if at this borderline there is suddenly the danger of madness, of debauch, of crime and suicide, then this speaks less against the truth than it speaks against man, who cannot stand the truth. This is all merely a disquieting indication that man in his apparent fullness, health and righteousness can only die in the face of God.

It looks almost as if true faith were a-moralism, the breaking down of any law. But here Barth comes back at us. While the Gospel of God's forgiving grace and mercy is the ultimate negation of all ethics, yet nevertheless, for that very reason, we stand under the law. The gospel of grace and mercy and the law are

<sup>25</sup> *Römerbrief*, pp. 421, 426, 485.

inseparably bound up together. At the border-line where we meet the impossibility of any standards, of any laws, we also meet the moral law, the very law we are unable to fulfill. The very fact of its existence, of its inexorable command, leads us to that last question, "What are we to do?" It is a question to which, in spite of the law and just because of the law, God alone can give the answer.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> "Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart," pp. 146-155.

## ARE CREEDS OUT OF DATE?

By THEODORE B. FOSTER, Western Theological Seminary

The question is stated broadly and in colloquial terms, but is not meant to be illusive or meaningless. It presupposes a definite context in current discussions and is provoked by certain mental attitudes, the full implications of which are not always perceived or squarely faced. That it is also a practical question for churches and teachers of religion can hardly be denied, if for no other reason than because of its relation to institutional Christianity. In saying this we have limited the field of our inquiry to certain formularies of belief having ecclesiastical sanction which from time to time have been imposed upon believers or proposed for their acceptance.

Aside from this limitation the question as offered is pointless. Everybody has something which he believes—at least, to quote Dr. Peabody (*The Church of the Spirit*, p. 22): "Every thinking person has a creed, if it be only the creed that all creeds are false. To deny one creed is to affirm another, and to deny all creeds is to confess that one has given up thinking." Accordingly, we may say of an individual that his creed is out of date, meaning that it is out of harmony with present day thought. This is to impeach his intelligence rather than his sincerity. The fact that it represents what he now believes makes it quite "up to date" for him. But this simple limitation carries one into the heart of the question. Obviously there is a sense in which creeds of churches like creeds of individuals are mutable, yet there is also this difference. In the case of the church or any other institution there must be some basic and commonly accepted body of beliefs which determines its character, marks its continuity, preserves its identity. Forfeiting or repudiating that, it ceases to be what it was before. There is, then, a permanent element com-

mon to all forms of Christian belief to which our question does not apply.

But, assuming this, the fact is obvious that from the beginning there have been wide differences of interpretation as to the Person of Christ and His teaching with even greater divergence in the whole field of Christian doctrine, much of this crystallizing itself in polemical dogma, and becoming the watchword of party and the cause of disunion. Many of these doctrinal issues are today quite obsolete, and the formulas in which they are embodied have by common consent passed into the discard. That the latter had a purpose to serve, that under the circumstances they were inevitable, that they hold a legitimate and necessary place in our understanding of Christian history must be conceded. But for practical purposes they are out of date. They are not ordinarily appealed to as offering light and leading for modern Christians, still less are they related to church membership tests. In some cases they are still venerated as denominational standards to which in a general way ministerial teaching is expected to conform, but even here their place is in the background.

A good illustration is the XXXIX Articles of Religion, so termed because including matters of faith and discipline. When published they were declared to be set forth for the quieting of controversy. Accordingly they abound in ambiguous statements. Only the clergy were required to subscribe to them and this is still the rule in England under terms less rigid than those formerly imposed. The American Episcopal Church had no "Articles of Religion" until 1801, in which year it adopted 37½ without the requirement of subscription by her clergy or laity. The fact is noted because Leuba in one of his books a few years ago affirmed the contrary, and this ignorance, the writer has since discovered, is shared by not a few who suppose that subscription to these articles is enjoined on candidates for confirmation. A year ago the General Convention voted to remove the Articles from the Prayer Book, with no provision for printing them anywhere else. This action was taken by an overwhelming majority of the clerical and lay deputies after a short and good natured discussion.

It merely registered what had long been recognized as the Church's mind. But it was hailed by certain newspapers as an astonishing and significant victory for liberalism, "the repudiation of old-time controversial positions," and more to the same effect, the truth of the matter being that that sixteenth century confession today serves no purpose, useful or otherwise, except that its retention might perpetuate the very misunderstandings to which I have referred. For better or worse we shall henceforth worry along without them. Meanwhile two ecumenical symbols commonly called the Apostles' and Nicene creeds are retained, the former as the Baptismal confession, and both as integral parts of our common worship, for one thing as a reminder that the Church has a definite faith to proclaim in contradistinction from an elaborate doctrinal system or a body of theological opinions.

These ancient formulas embody what institutional Christianity has for centuries recognized as only the basic and determinative facts of a Divine revelation. Broadly speaking they are regarded as the equivalent of these, rather than as a particular doctrinal interpretation. Whether, in view of what is known of their genesis and development, they may justly be so regarded is *nil ad rem*, so far as the present point is concerned. It does not greatly matter, for example, that we owe the first article of the Apostles' Creed to anti-Marcionite polemic, or that, in the face of Arian teaching, the unscriptural word *homoousios* was adopted at Nicea to define what was believed about Christ. We say it does not greatly matter, because as a whole these ancient symbols are held to represent the primary gospel data—as distinct even from New Testament theological inference—and are thus, in the original and narrowest sense of the term, strictly evangelical. It is easy to challenge this alleged correspondence but the utmost that radical criticism can do with the persuasion itself is to pronounce it naïve. It must at least be allowed that it is a venerable convention which equates the two things, also that some conventions, even such as were quite arbitrary in their inception, acquire the character of permanence when given sufficient time. As an illustration of this general statement our national ensign comes to

mind. The flag is coeval with our independence. It is enough to say that it is our own; though in point of fact it has come to represent the triumph of a certain political theory of our union of states achieved at the cost of the greatest civil war in history. But with this and other associations that have endeared it to us it is after all only an arbitrary conventional symbol.

The ecumenical creeds are symbols in a different sense and regarded as conventional formulas they are not arbitrary but vital. Contrary to an impression which prevails in some quarters and is sedulously fostered by opponents of "credal Christianity," the process which culminated in their formulation was determined at every step of the way not so much by a doctrinal as by an ethical and soteriological interest, an interest which persists today. Hence, limiting the inquiry with which we set out to these same ecumenical creeds, the answer immediately suggested is that they are no more out of date than are the particular New Testament facts which they profess to represent and with which they stand or fall.

This assertion at once raises several important questions which are not to be disposed of in a summary manner. But merely to state them fairly and in their proper coördination is impossible in a short paper. However, the question of credal interpretation—its place and its limits—is most insistent. Obviously this presupposes an agreement to retain the creeds, also that in any case interpretation is inevitable, and that different interpretations are to be expected. But the matter concerns not so much individual variants as the reaction of that attitude of mind known as modern or scientific. It is assumed by not a few that the abcs of modern astronomy dating from Kepler and Copernicus have rendered certain articles of the creed obsolete. The thing is not always so bluntly stated, but the supposed fact is heralded almost as a new discovery. In this connection the element of humor enters into the situation, when we go back to the fourth century and find Jerome inveighing against the literal absurdities of some of his contemporaries in regard to the Ascension and Heavenly Session of Christ. His strictures have a very modern sound. But, one



naturally asks, What is the specific demand of "the modern mind" in the premises?

We note as many as four different attitudes: (1) Entire indifference to the subject. (2) Insistence on full liberty of interpretation while retaining the language of the creeds. (3) Objection to parts of this language with a plea for restatement. (4) Despairing of this, the proposal to substitute for the ancient formularies a bare avowal either of allegiance to Christ or of the will to enlist in the service of humanity.

As a matter of principle or theory, the case for restatement is far from being closed. The early history of symbolics is a history of restatement, which perhaps is enough on that head. But it also happens that Lutherans have substituted "Christian" for "Catholic" in their version of the creed and that Anglicans in this country have exercised the same liberty in the case of another article. In the eighteenth century permission was given to omit in public recitation the words "He descended into hell" or, instead, to use the words "He went into the place of departed spirits"—regarded as an equivalent. Forty years ago the former of these permissions was withdrawn from the rubric but the latter was allowed to stand and is there today in spite of the fact that no congregation appears to have availed itself of the liberty in either respect.

A secular parallel in the matter of authoritative documents (with provision for amendment or interpretation of the same) is found in our national constitution. We are familiar with the means employed to preserve its integrity and also to permit it to function under changing conditions of our national life. Whether we have overdone the business of amending it is a moot point. Certainly we have not come to the end of the process of interpreting its provisions. But as a whole the instrument has stood the test of time and may be regarded as fairly permanent, including the clause about "Indians not taxed." If we were merely to theorize, the possibility of a different political system supplanting our own might be entertained. In view of the fact that some nations exist without written constitutions, and the

further fact that there are marked tendencies at work affecting not only the integrity of our political system but the permanence of our social order, the speculation is far from being inherently absurd. Surely he would be a bold theorist who would affirm outright the survival of our most cherished institutions through all time to come. The experience of supplanting one written instrument of government by another is not uncommon. Our state constitutions suffer this fate without exciting alarm, for the reason that there is no departure from basic principle—with the change there is real continuity and a general conformity to type.

The question with relation to creeds, as thus far considered, has concerned existing creeds. But, in line with what has just been said, it has a wider reference and calls for a more definite statement. Can we not get along without creeds? Would not our religion be all the better if the sincere inquirer or the convinced believer were not confronted with the demand of conformity to authoritative credenda?

Proponents of this revolutionary change, it should be observed, are not fairly chargeable with indiscriminate censure of the Church's past. Their position is quite consistent with an acknowledgment that in earlier days the common faith of Christians properly made use of authoritative formulæ as an essential means of self-preservation. The method was right for the times; but *tempora mutantur*, etc. If another method, one better adapted to present day requirements, were to offer itself should we hesitate to adopt it? The point I am making—that of doing full justice to this contention—has some light thrown upon it by the nature of the plea so sedulously urged for the outlawry of war. It is not maintained that all past wars were unnecessary or productive of nothing but evil. Rather, it is frankly admitted that in the upward struggle of mankind the method of armed conflict was the evolutionary means of progress. Incidentally also attention is called to the fact that one of the concomitants of war long since happily obsolete—the enslavement of captives—was a marked advance over the cannibalism or the slaughter of captives which it supplanted. With all this, and because of all this, we

are now urged to take the further step of declaring war itself out of date as a recognized method of settling international disputes. Considering what it has come to be on a large scale in the modern world—nothing less than the destruction of civilization; and considering further that, however restricted in area, it accomplishes no beneficial results (nor even the particular end in view) that could not be achieved more speedily by a simpler and more rational method; it is already condemned by the verdict of enlightened mankind, to say nothing of the aroused corporate conscience of Christendom.

Similarly, the case for shelving the creeds is based, broadly speaking, upon the conviction that whatever useful service they may have rendered in the past they have ceased to render that service today; also that the end supposed to be achieved by them may be reached more speedily and effectively by a newer method—at once more sensible and more Christian—which shall have all the advantages minus the disadvantages of the old.

Specifically, it is claimed that the laudable purpose of uniting Christians by a common credal formula is effective today only in part, and largely only in appearance; also that creeds have become symbols of division, marks of separation, and barriers of exclusion to many men of good will. Protestantism born in the throes of doctrinal controversy and inheriting the dogmatic views of a scholasticism gone to seed, has long exhibited a divisive tendency. It has sloughed off the waste matter of its internal controversies, but the old scars remain as a witness and a warning. And the lesson is being heeded. The cry is now for conciliation, and it is not surprising that those who urge the propriety of abolishing all credal tests hail this as the psychological moment for making their contention felt.

Briefly stated, the two points emphasized are as follows: There is first the general admission that loyalty to Christ does not consist of a mere intellectual assent to propositions concerning Him: and, that being the case, why not put into practice what is granted in theory? Why not abandon as a formal test what has been

found by experience to be valueless? So much for that part of the argument.

The second part concerns the attitude of Christ in the matter of discipleship. Applied to the subject before us, it would stigmatize the imposition of any creed, as an act of gross presumption, not merely or chiefly because it adds to the simple requirements He has laid down but because it is alien to the spirit of His requirement. In sum, the contention is that the whole method is faulty and obsolete. As brief compendia of what the great body of Christians have regarded as expressing the basic faith of the Church the ecumenical creeds have their place—in the archives. As expressing the faith of modern believers they err by defect or by excess and in either case are to be pronounced unsuitable for the individual's use. For religious purposes they are today to be regarded as "out of date."

But the case thus far is only half stated, because usually a substitute for the doctrinal creed is proposed—something which shall relate the believer definitely to Christ, without pledging him to the acceptance of any Christology ancient or modern. In line with the popular aversion to dogmatic statement, this contemplates the simple acknowledgment of Christ as Master in the sense of Teacher, the believer thereby constituting himself as pupil or disciple with the pledge avowed or implied of some effort to follow the example as well as the teaching of Christ. Less than this could hardly be demanded by the Christian society if it is to differ at all from the Society for Ethical Culture. More than this, so we are given to understand, is superfluous, assuming that the end proposed is acceptance of the religion of Christ in such wise as to carry it into daily life. And that, by the way, is confessedly the end proposed under all dogmatic systems. To give a respectable instance with which the writer is most familiar, the Book of Common Prayer, after exacting as a preliminary a declaration of belief in "all the articles of the Christian faith as contained in the Apostles' Creed" reminds the newly baptized that "baptism doth represent unto us our profession, which is to follow the example of our Saviour Christ and to be made like

unto Him," adding that this will mean for them "a continual mortifying of all evil and corrupt affections, and daily proceeding in all virtue and godliness of living." The solemn charge delivered to the baptized in the tone of authoritative pronouncement reaches its rhetorical and logical climax in these emphatic words. They represent the ground which is common to both parties in the issue we are discussing. The advocate and the opponent of credal subscription find themselves in hearty agreement here. The issue between them, at least in form, is distinctly pragmatic. It is frankly one of method, as before remarked, and is now stressed for the purpose of noting the state of the question.

What, then, is to be said on the other side?

In any attempt at revolutionary change the burden of proof is usually assumed by the innovators. But in the judgment of the present writer the case for the defense of the existing method is better stated without reliance upon any such technical advantage. To come at once to particulars, the claim that mere persistence over long periods of time renders any usage sacrosanct and inviolable simply begs the question. Equally inept is the plea that only a very small portion of present day Christendom is in a position even to entertain the suggestion. The Catholic communions and an overwhelming majority of Protestant Churches will be in opposition to such a novel program, as a matter of course. But equally of course this fact is discounted by those who challenge the existing practice. Believing they are right they can afford to wait for vindication. In the meantime their contention is not to be brushed aside merely because it is yet in the stage of experimentation. It is entitled to free discussion on its merits.

To begin with the sanction claimed for the established practice in the New Testament, it is to be said that the first preachers of the gospel required an initial acceptance of Christ, rather than a general evaluation of His teaching. The latter would be logically involved in the former which could always be appealed to as its justification, *e.g.* Acts 20:35. This acceptance of Christ was based upon a very definite truth proclaimed about Him whether always explicitly stated or not. Requirement of oral confession

of faith in Him, as in the formula, "Jesus is Lord," coupled with a belief in His resurrection—this as the condition of salvation—is the Pauline summary of "the word of faith which we preach."

The statement that Christ Himself made no such specific demand is of course literally true—if we consent to ignore His requirement that He be confessed before men—but in the present connection is gravely misleading. If His habitual self-assertion had any reference to the purpose of His mission—and aside from this surely it were pointless—He was deliberately making Himself an object of faith in such wise as fully to justify the subsequent procedure of His Church. He offers Himself as the primary *credendum*. This contention has been maintained from the beginning and modern New Testament research has only confirmed its validity. Its significance in the present discussion is obvious. As determining the conditions of intelligent and conscientious discipleship it is as valid today as it was nineteen centuries ago.

Yet, ignoring all this, it is frequently said that His doctrine of a life that is pleasing to God along with His own illustrative example may be trusted to carry conviction and result in imitation: that if and when this happens a true appraisal of His person will inevitably follow. Whereas if we begin with some authoritative dictum (a theological definition) we may have a religion *about* Jesus not the religion *of* Jesus. One might almost imagine from the confident tone in which this unscriptural antithesis is stressed that the more we know about Him the less concern we shall feel to be like Him, that a positive faith in His authority, to start with, and His own requirement that such faith should be explicitly confessed, only raise gratuitous difficulties. The indictment against the Church is that it is too solicitous about correct belief. Would the objector, then, desire to have the Church *define any terms* of discipleship, or would he prefer a definition from the lips of Christ Himself? According to the Third Evangelist, the Master was sufficiently explicit in requiring a pledge of renunciation at the outset that is thorough-going, to



say the least; "If a man cometh unto me and hateth not his own father and mother, and wife and children, and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. So therefore, whosoever he be of you that renounceth not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." Plainly to require acceptance of such teaching as this is to require at the same time a very positive affirmation of His personal authority—that is to say, of the unique place which His Person holds in the scale of being. F. C. Baur (*New Testament Theology*, p. 110) long ago remarked: "With His doctrine His person is inseparably connected. He is the concrete embodiment of the eternal significance of the absolute truth of His doctrine." And we may add that the natural method to promote the acceptance of His doctrine is the method of instructing men as to His Person. It should also be said with the strongest emphasis that in putting Christology to the fore—and the whole argument for creeds centers in this—the church has the strongest practical interest in commending the teaching of her Lord. That this purpose has frequently been misconceived and in countless individual cases has failed to realize itself is freely granted. But such results are not fairly attributable to any defect in the principle: the fault lies wholly in failure to apply it. It is a purely gratuitous assumption that the argument for a theological or any other formula of belief regards the mere acceptance or the open avowal of the same as strictly an end in itself—still less as any substitute either for "heart cognition" or for a whole-hearted obedience to moral requirements. But it does insist that some knowledge of the object of faith is essential to the vitality of any faith worthy of the name, that there is a distinct moral value to the individual in the act of sincere and public avowal of such faith, and, finally, that primary lessons in the intellectual contents of that faith, being in line with a true educational method, are, and must ever be, indispensable. The phrase "primary lessons" is used advisedly. It is applicable in this matter with few exceptions to all sorts and conditions of men—not only to children. The spiritually elite or mature are a negligible minority in the mass of mankind to whom our evan-

gelistic message comes. What the common man requires is a clear and concise statement of the truth he is expected to receive as commended by those who have tested and proved it. If they have no such truth to declare they are wasting their time, and *his*, as he would be apt to remind them. The typical experience is that related by the fourth evangelist: "Dost thou believe in the Son of God?" (or "the Son of Man?") "Who is He, Lord, that I may believe on Him?" And when the answer is given the confession follows.

Now, without laboring the point further, let us return to the proposition which frankly inverts the traditional method. Suppose we begin our approach to the individual by asking his acceptance of Christ's moral teaching—say what He delivers in the summary of the Law and the Golden Rule. The former is not distinctively Christian (*teste* Jesus) and "to requite hatred with goodness" was taught by Lao Tse (*Canon of Reason and Virtue*, tr. by Paul Carus, § 63, p. 129). But waiving this, and no one would deny the fundamental importance of these formulas as explicitly enjoined by Christ, it is apparent that we are starting with an ethical creed, a minimum of credenda imposed by the highest authority. *Mutatis mutandis*, some of the objections brought against the imposition of doctrinal formulas would be as valid, *i.e.* as fallacious, in this case as in that. To demand in either method any such virtue as a guarantee of the development of Christian character is to demand what neither method pretends to insure, and what both, in all imaginable conjunctions, frequently fail to effect. If it be said at this point that the question resolves itself into one of relative emphasis or merely of priority as between two methods, we have only to say that that is not the proposition under discussion. We are asked to consider the rejection of the method associated with what is termed credal Christianity as outworn, and to substitute for it a different method as likely to produce better results, and more directly aimed at the end in view. Mediating propositions like that of Dr. James Denney (in *Jesus and the Gospel*, closing chapter) would claim

attention, were space available for a fuller discussion of the general subject.

Two points may be noted in conclusion. One item in the indictment of ecumenical creeds is the charge that they bar the way to Christian unity. Is it imagined that any ethical substitute will unite us all? Apparently something like this is hoped for in certain quarters. Yet it is a fair question as matters now stand whether theological differences are greater obstacles to godly union and concord than the mutually antagonistic moral attitudes we have to reckon with in organized Christendom. The fact of these antagonisms is too patent to require illustration.

Finally, and as a practical matter, one must recognize that the discarding of formal doctrinal creeds will never dispose of theological questionings in matters of faith, and if such questioning be open to censure those who are most truly religious will sooner or later come to be esteemed as the chief offenders. We have to thank modern New Testament experts for the creation of the greater interest on the basis of which some most important theological problems relate themselves to the common intellectual life of Christian believers. But aside from this, the disuse or discrediting of formal creeds, could this be brought about, would not—could not—be the final step. The question would inevitably arise as to what should be done with the mass of our devotional literature. We do not forget that our hymnology enshrines much traditional Christian doctrine. Logical consistency would call for the elimination of a great deal of this material, containing *e.g.* dogmatic pronouncements on the doctrine of reconciliation about which the Church as a whole has never presumed to speak in terms of authoritative definition, thereby permitting, so far as her creeds are concerned, all the freedom of interpretation which the most extreme liberal can claim. But this feature of positive doctrine in some of our most popular hymns is *a fortiori* obnoxious to the same criticism as that which we have been discussing.

Our impression, then, of the program of action based upon the assumption that dogmatic creeds have had their day, is that of

its magnitude—whatever else is to be said about it. It is something that at once refuses confinement to the limits of academic discussion. The implications of the theory, to borrow an alliterative bit of Browning's verse, are "multiform, manifold, menacing." They threaten forms of expression stereotyped from long association with varieties of Christian experience, so that any serious talk of carrying the method to its logical issue must count on the determined opposition of many who hold no brief for traditionalism as such.

And not the least significant feature of the present theological situation is the unequivocal loyalty of many scholarly exponents of liberalism to the principle of the credal method which has characterized institutional Christianity from the first.

## BEHAVIORISM AND UTILITARIANISM

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Not so far from one hundred years ago appeared the first edition of James Mill's *Analysis of the Human Mind*, the psychological formulation of a young and promising radicalism of that age beginning to be known as Utilitarianism. It was a movement which received a large part of its inspiration from the achievements of contemporary science. It was characterized on the one hand by an eagerness to apply the methods of science to psychology, morals, and problems of social life, especially political economy, and on the other hand by an intense and exceedingly vocal dislike for sentimentalism, mysticism, and obscurantism in general, and in particular for the church, which to the Utilitarian way of thinking was the incarnation of these undesirable qualities. The Utilitarians called down upon their heads the eloquent wrath of the more conservative minded people of their day—and made a vast contribution toward the advancement of psychology, ethics, economics, and government.

A new "ism" of our day, Behaviorism, has many features that are surprisingly like this other "ism" of a hundred years ago. It is perhaps true that in the long run Utilitarianism will be found to have played a larger part in the history of nineteenth century thought than Behaviorism will be found to have played in the twentieth century. To us, who are in the middle of things, and thereby are handicapped as judges, Utilitarianism looks like an altogether more imposing affair than Behaviorism. Nevertheless, the parallel between Utilitarianism and Behaviorism is striking.

In the first place, they sprang from similar motives. The Utilitarians were inspired by the achievement of science in their time. Mathematics, physics, and chemistry were making prog-

ress by trying to explain complex phenomena in terms of simple units regarded as being alike and having their relation to each other determined by a few simple laws. This method they undertook to apply to psychology, ethics, and political economy.

In his preface to his father's *Analysis of the Human Mind* referred to above, John Stuart Mill says, "The phenomena of Mind include multitudes of facts, of an extraordinary degree of complexity. By observing them one at a time with sufficient care, it is possible in the mental, as it is in the material world, to obtain empirical generalizations of limited compass, but of great value for practice." He goes on to say that James Mill "merely applied to mental science the idea of scientific inquiry which had been matured by the successful pursuit, for many generations, of the knowledge of external nature."<sup>1</sup>

Compare with this, John B. Watson in *Behaviorism*:

"In 1912 the behaviorists reached the conclusion that they could no longer be content to work with intangibles and unapproachables. They decided either to give up psychology or else to make it a natural science. They saw their brother-scientists making progress in medicine, in chemistry, in physics. Every new discovery in those fields was of prime importance; every new element isolated in one laboratory could be isolated in some other laboratory; each new element was immediately taken up in the warp and woof of science as a whole.

... "In his first efforts to get uniformity in subject matter and in methods, the behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions."<sup>2</sup>

He goes on to say,

"You will find, then, the behaviorist working like any other scientist. His sole object is to gather facts about behavior—verify his data—subject them both to logic and to mathematics (the tools of every scientist). He brings the newborn individual into his *experimental nursery* and begins to set problems."<sup>3</sup>

Another important and characteristic note in the thought of the Utilitarians—especially in the first generations of the Utilitarians—was the idea that all individuals start life with equal

<sup>1</sup> Mill, James, *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, Preface by John Stuart Mill, p. vi.

<sup>2</sup> Watson, John B., *Behaviorism*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.



capacities, and that what they become depends upon how they are educated. In the case of Bentham and James Mill and their friends, this goes back historically to Locke and his *tabula rasa* theory of the human mind. But it was an over-simplification demanded by their particular way of applying the method of science to the "phenomena of the mind." The same over-simplification has come to life again with the Behaviorists. With them it takes the form of an animus against eugenists, mental-testers, and their like—an animus which is in the main a healthy one. But they outdo themselves in their insistence that all men are born, if not free, emphatically equal. Charged with this, they might deny it and say that they are simply refusing to believe in innate differences between individuals until these differences are shown to exist, but in the hurly-burly of psychological polemics they forget this qualification. Watson says:

"One of our problems has been to find out the facts about the inheritance of instincts and of 'mental' dispositions and capacities. The behaviorist finds that the human being at birth is a very lowly piece of unformed protoplasm, ready to be shaped by any family in whose care it is first placed." . . .

"It is our finding so far that conditioning—nurture not nature—starts so early that the biologists and eugenists and the non-behavioristic psychologists have had no opportunity to make valid observations upon the inheritance of instincts and 'mental' capacities. By the end of his second year the child's temper is well organized; his vocational slants, his character, his fears, his positive bent toward things—toward pencil, paper, chalk, carpentry, water, social relations—have been so slanted that only a divine being could unmake him and give him over to the biologist as new material fit to watch for the unfolding of family traits.

"So when the experimental evolutionist and the mental testers—the latter are even predicting the future genius on the basis of the six-year-old test—tell us that their studies of gifted families show that 'gifts' are handed on to children, the behaviorist laughs." <sup>4</sup>

Both in the Utilitarians and the Behaviorists this postulate of psychological equality has been the starting point of an exceedingly optimistic view of the possibilities of education. Characteristic of the nineteenth century was the doctrine that you could make of a person anything you liked by education. This was the

<sup>4</sup> Watson, John B., "Behaviorism and Some of Its Ethical Implications," *Mental Health Bulletin*, Chicago, June, 1927, Vol. V, No. 9.

background of Owen's Socialism. This is the theory that finds its classical expression in the education of John Stuart Mill.

In the article just quoted Watson goes on to say:

"Now isn't all this far better and more thrilling than instincts? Is the behaviorist going to tear down the world by finding that, instead of instincts in the child which are irrevocable and beyond our control, he has limitless plasticity at the start? Doesn't it give every parent—every potential parent—a kind of open as well as secret exhilaration to learn that his child does not have to carry along many of the weaknesses and inferiorities he possesses. Doesn't it give every man and woman who has failed and who has attributed that failure to faulty inheritance or 'fundamental constitution' a thought that possibly his or her own efforts have in the past not been quite vigorous enough?

"And doesn't it make all of us responsible in a way for failures in society—for our criminals—our drug fiends and for the ignorance and stupidity of the masses?"

As a result of their attempt to study human nature in terms of science, both Utilitarians and Behaviorists have come into sharp conflict with champions of the established order in morals and religion. The Utilitarians suffered many things at the hands of holy men and fell back on the good old eighteenth century theory that religion was superstition and was fostered by a priestly cult for their own nefarious ends. Bentham, in his own private lingo, nicknamed the Church of England "Jug," short for Juggernaut. In an early speech of John Stuart Mills (in 1823, when he was still very whole-heartedly a Utilitarian), he builds up an argument on the thesis that "priests are men" and therefore that when "their interest is opposed to the interest of mankind they will act as other men would act in similar circumstances; they would pursue their own interest to the detriment of mankind." In this way he accounts for "the profitable doctrine of purgatory and masses for the dead, the crime-promoting doctrine of indulgences, and above all the terrific engine of auricular confession and absolution."<sup>5</sup>

With this background the young Utilitarians sallied forth to ridicule and refute dignitaries of church and state. They held sacred no policy, belief, or institution. They took fiendish delight in shocking piety and respectability.

<sup>5</sup> *Autobiography of John Stuart Mill*, pp. 272-3, Oxford edition.

So with the Behaviorists. Again we quote Watson:

"No one knows just how the idea of a soul or the supernatural started. It probably had its origin in the general laziness of mankind. Certain individuals who in primitive society declined to work with their hands, to go out hunting, to make flints, to dig for roots, became keen observers of human nature."

"The 'medicine men' of primitive times soon established an elaborate control through signs, symbols, rituals, formulæ, and the like. Medicine men have always flourished. A good medicine man has the best of everything and, best of all, he doesn't have to work. These individuals have been variously called medicine men, soothsayers, dream-interpreters and prophets. Skill in bringing about these emotional conditionings of the people increased rapidly; organization among medicine men took place and we began to have religions of one kind or another, and churches, temples, cathedrals and the like, each presided over by a medicine man."<sup>6</sup>

And again:

"I would like to point out here that some time we will have a behavioristic ethics, experimental in type, which will tell us whether it is advisable from the standpoint of present and future adjustments of the individual to have one wife or many wives; to have capital punishment or punishment of any kind; whether prohibition or no prohibition; easy divorces or no divorces; whether many of our other prescribed courses of conduct make for adjustment of the individual or the contrary, such for example as having a family life or even knowing our own fathers and mothers."<sup>7</sup>

And so on, ad infinitum, to the consternation and distress of the godly.

We may profitably ask, what has been the verdict of history as far as the Utilitarians are concerned? Their attempt to inject a scientific point of view into psychology, morals, economics and political science, while it led them into some errors, was the most important thing that happened in their field of human interest in the first half of the last century. The names of Bentham and James Mill, Ricardo, and Place, John Austin and George Grote, to say nothing of John Stuart Mill, are honored, while the names of their adversaries are either forgotten, or, like Lord Eldon and MacIntosh and Whewell and Sir William Hamilton cling to a precarious immortality because they were demolished by one or the other of this doughty crew. Their exaggerations and im-

<sup>6</sup> Watson, John B., *Behaviorism*, pp. 3, 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

pertinences are either forgotten or gratefully appreciated by a generation that can see both the strength and the weakness of the conservatism they were fighting against. John Stuart Mill grew out of his narrow sectarianism into a catholicity of outlook which enabled him to be the prophet of a synthesis of what was best in the old with what was good in the new.

So to-day, with regard to the Behaviorists, there is a lesson in this for those who believe in the essential integrity of a conservative position, at least in the field of religion and ethics. We must not fret ourselves because of the ungodly—we need fear neither their noisy denials nor their unpleasant epithets. That which they have to give which is true, which is positive, which is calculated to throw new light on the workings of human nature, the meaning of human happiness, and the building of a better social order we must accept, not grudgingly, but gladly. That, after all, is the task of this church—the building of all truth into the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. And not only once in the course of history, but many times, has the stone which the builders rejected become the headstone of the corner.

## NOTES, COMMENTS, AND PROBLEMS

By BURTON SCOTT EASTON, General Theological Seminary

Among the various archaeological expeditions in Palestine unusually fruitful results have been obtained by the scholars at work at Nasbeh (Mizpah?), some eight miles north of Jerusalem. Professor Grant now announces the discovery in a lower layer of a pre-Israelitish city, rectangular and with extraordinarily strong fortifications. Vessels of clay and glass, ornaments, knives of bronze and stone, statuettes (particularly of Astarte) and inscriptions have been brought to light in quantities.

In Jerusalem itself, during street excavations, a new portion of what is probably the old third wall was laid bare just outside the grounds belonging to the American School, and Dr. Sukenik has identified this portion as the bases of the Women's Towers mentioned by Josephus in *BJ* V, iii. The Department of Antiquities has made the American School the custodian of the new discovery.

Mr. D. J. Chitty, of New College, Oxford, identified an opening in a cliff ten miles east of Jerusalem as the mouth of a cave, accessible only by ladder or rope. Investigation proved it to be the home of the fifth century hermit Theoctistus, which had been converted into a church with a mosaic floor and frescoes. These are probably the earliest extant specimens of Christian pictorial art in Palestine.

Three new periodicals are of interest to theologians. The *New Scholasticism*, edited by E. A. Pace and J. H. Ryan, is published by the Catholic University, of Washington, D. C. *L'Artisan Liturgique* is published at Lille. And *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*, edited by Hugo Fischer of Leipsic, is published by Junker & Dünnhaupt of Berlin.

Dr. D. D. Luckenbill, whose death is noticed below, has been

succeeded at the University of Chicago by Dr. Chiera, of the University of Pennsylvania.

Canon B. H. Streeter during the coming winter and spring will deliver the Noble Lectures at Harvard and the Haskell Lectures at Oberlin.

Again a lamentably long necrology list must be chronicled.

The Most Reverend John Henry Bernard, sometime Archbishop of Dublin and at the time of his death Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, was born in India in 1860. His record as a student at Dublin University was very distinguished, including a senior Wranglership in mathematics and philosophy, and a list of his subsequent honors would fill many lines. His first literary work was in connection with Kant, followed by liturgical writings (especially a two-volume edition of the *Irish Liber Hymnorum*), well-known New Testament commentaries, a critical edition of Bishop Butler's works, and a long series of volumes of sermons. Elevated to the episcopate in 1911, he served as Archbishop during the frightfully trying Irish years 1915-1919, after which he resigned. During the last years of his life he devoted himself especially to his commentary on St. John in the International Critical series, which was announced as "in press" last spring.

Joseph Estlin Carpenter's career was not less distinguished. Born in 1844, he entered the Unitarian ministry in 1866 and became a lecturer at Manchester College, Oxford, in 1875. His literary activity was divided between Unitarian biography, the Old Testament (the edition of the Hexateuch which he and Dr. Harford-Battersby prepared was long a standard), Indian philosophy and the New Testament. In the latter field he began in 1890 with a most useful book, *The First Three Gospels*, and closed in the present year with *The Johannine Writings*. This last volume showed not the slightest falling off in either literary power or critical judgment and moved as easily in the post-war literature as if his whole training had been in recent theories.

John Bagnell Bury, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, was born in 1861. Despite the



title of his chair most of his publications bore on either classical or medieval topics, but his *Life of St. Patrick* (1905) and his *Idea of Progress* (1920) have special theological interest.

Daniel David Luckenbill, Professor in Semitics at the University of Chicago, was only forty-six years old. A specialist in Assyriology, and coöperating editor of the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature*, he was just beginning the publication of the results of his researches; his *Annals of Sennacherib* is a superbly edited volume.

Franz Praetorius, Professor of Semitic Languages at the University of Breslau, was seventy-nine years old, and Johannes Kunze, Professor of Systematic Theology in Greifswald, was sixty-one years old.

Philip Henry Wicksteed, who was born in 1844, was best known as a leading English authority on Dante. But his massive *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy* (1920; a study of Aquinas) was in its way an authoritative contribution to its field.

Donald Macmillan wrote on Scottish history, particularly ecclesiastical history. He was seventy-one years old.

Gertrude Margaret Lowthian Bell, who collaborated with Sir William Ramsay in *The Thousand and One Churches* and who was the author of various other works dealing with Oriental literature and research, stood probably first among England's women Orientalists. During the war she filled many military posts supposedly reserved for men and was "mentioned" frequently in despatches. In 1920 she was appointed Oriental Secretary to the High Commissioner of the Iraq.

Wilford Lash Robbins, sometime Dean of the General Theological Seminary, was born in 1859. His best known book was *A Christian Apologetic* (1902).

Although not a theologian, Sir Harry Johnston's name may be mentioned here on account of his caustic criticisms of certain missionary activities in Africa.

## REVIEWS

*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel.* By James A. Montgomery. New York: Scribners, 1927, pp. xxi + 488. \$4.50.

It is more than two generations since a full-sized Commentary on Daniel has appeared in English, and of late much of the English work (specifically, American) has been from an extremely conservative point of view. Criticism seems now, however, to be settling down upon certain positions as assured, *e.g.*, the Maccabæan date of the work as a whole, the exegesis of its historical allusions in the light of contemporary or immediately prospective events, the definitely post-exilic theology and thoroughly indigenous Judaism of its author. These positions Dr. Montgomery's *opus magnum* will go a great way toward finally establishing. If the delay in appearance of a first-rate English commentary were, in some fanciful sense, necessitated by the quality of the book before us, it could receive no more complete justification. For the volume gathers up the vast fruitage of all earlier investigation and exposition of Daniel, scrutinizes it with the most thorough philological and historical acumen, and presents in clear and lucid style the conclusions of what might well have been a lifetime of research in one special field.

One outstanding merit of the book is its thoroughgoing investigation of the textual history, including the ancient versions; another is the sound philological criticism of the text after its restoration; a third is the extensive use made of Jewish exegesis, particularly Mediæval and Pre-mediæval, and of patristic interpretation (two lines of exegetical tradition which meet, singularly, in St. Jerome, who studied the O. T. in the original, under the guidance of Jewish teachers). As a fourth advantage, deriving from the one just mentioned, may be added the author's thorough acquaintance with the literature, history, theology, religious thought and devotional life of Judaism: this saves him from

more than one bizarre theory current in theological circles during the past generation, such as would attribute Daniel—and the apocalyptic literature generally—to Babylonian or other foreign influences and its theology to the spread of Zoroastrianism.

This is not to deny the composite character of the book. Cc. 1-6 are assumed to be a pre-Maccabæan writing, composed in Babylonia probably in the 3d century (not earlier than the division of Alexander's empire). Cc. 7-12 belong to the first years of the Maccabæan uprising, 168-165 B.C., and the four Visions are regarded as composed *seriatim*. And in its present form, *i.e.*, the *Daniel Stories* supplemented by the *Visions*, the book belongs to the literature of Apocalyptic. This means that, while making use of a literary device thus gradually increasing in use, the convictions and hopes of the author are derived ultimately from immediate experience. "In all these books [Apoc., 2 Esd., Dan.] there is discovered a genuine personal touch which appears to reveal actual spiritual experience"—a position in which Professor Montgomery agrees with Dr. Charles, the great authority on Apocalyptic. This observation provides a principle for exegesis:

"Apocalyptic will never be sympathetically appreciated until we bring it under the category of the poet and the seer. Psychologically literary and religious inspiration have very much in common, and the intellectual and artistic elements may not be discounted in religious inspiration. . . . Daniel is the classical apocalypse of the O. T.; with all its peculiar literary art and its mystical practice of religion, it remains true to Judaism, and, more than this, it develops the latter legitimately in translating it into transcendental terms" (p. 104).

The brief section of the Introduction (§ 20; ten pages) devoted to 'The Theology of the Book and its Place in Jewish Religion' is an admirably compact summary, and should be carefully read in connection with the exegesis of the relevant passages. Of particular importance for the study of the *New Testament* and the *Origins of Christianity* are the teachings on Eschatology and the Messiah. Except for the resurrection of a few belonging to each contending party, a resurrection apparently

to this world, the doctrine of the book is very meagre. There is no Messiah, though the figure of the 'Son of Man' in ch. 7 "promptly lent itself to the formulation of a heavenly Messiah." The doctrine of the resurrection is "typical of the individualism of later Judaism; salvation is no longer for all Israel after the flesh; the Saints compose the *ecclesia in Ecclesia*" (pp. 84 f.; cf. Note at end of Ch. vii).

I cannot forbear quoting further:

"In this review there appears little that is otherwise than genuine development of the older Bible religion. Without doubt there was a quickening of Jewish theology from without, for the religions of the ancient world were passing through identical changes in close contact with one another, and the sympathy of experience must have favored interchanges. The tendency toward monotheism, the problems involved in a moral rule of the universe and in the fate of the individual, even scientific speculations, these factors are found working from Persia to Egypt and Greece in the West. But the book of Daniel remains essentially Jewish, and in this respect differs from most of the later apocalyptic literature, which is generally marked by a crass eclecticism. The first six chapters present a background of Babylonian heathenism, which still survived under the Persian, Greek and Parthian dominions. Some would indeed have it that there is a heavy deposit of Babylonian myth and lore in Daniel, *e.g.*, Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos*, but such views depend upon many assumptions. . . . But the book is a standing protest against Babylonism" (p. 85).

Considering the importance of Daniel for later apocalyptic eschatology and Christology, which in turn set the stage for primitive Christianity—its importance, *i.e.*, for Jewish and Christian Messianism—the writing deserves the most careful study and interpretation. It is doubtful if a better or more thorough commentary will ever be written. It combines the utmost sanity and balance of historical judgment with exhaustive philological and exegetical research. There may be disagreement with particular views; but no one, henceforth, can claim to have studied the Book of Daniel or presume to interpret it and leave the International Critical Commentary out of account. We Americans are sometimes accused—perhaps justly—of producing a lot of second-rate 'religious literature,' not to say trash; but when two works of superb scholarship like Professor G. F. Moore's *Judaism* and

Professor Montgomery's *Daniel* are published within a year, we may well take hope and feel that all is not lost—yet.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

*Jesus Christ and His Revelation: Fresh Evidence from Christian Sources and Josephus.* By Vacher Burch. London: Chapman and Hall, 1927, pp. xi + 177. 9s.

Dr. Vacher Burch is a fellow worker, and presumably a disciple, of that versatile veteran Dr. Rendel Harris; and certainly at least the fringe of his master's mantle has fallen upon him. Dr. Burch's learning is both profound and wide, and he has caught something of his friend's ingenuity. For Rendel Harris is specially interesting because his treasures of learning, which are those of a multi-millionaire among the scholars of the age, are so displayed that they fill us with admiration; yet, if we are tempted to envy his opulence, we cannot but love the genuine humour with which he discloses it. Profound as is his learning, serious as are his aims, he never fails to be amusing, for he almost invariably has some pet theory or hobby of his own, which, whether one agrees with him or not, is sure to divert and interest. Thus whether Rendel Harris discourses on the peculiarity of a manuscript, Heavenly Twins, or the relics of the good ship Mayflower, he is a source of constant delight to his readers.

Dr. Vacher Burch is ingenious, but he lacks his master's lightness of touch. He writes as a learned man, with all the jargon of erudition, and, it must be owned, with not a little of its obscurity. Indeed when one has read a chapter, it is necessary not only to reread it but to ponder seriously as to its meaning. Still one's care is generally repaid even if, with the superficial knowledge of an ordinary man, one fails to be sure that one has really followed his argument. However, the general object of the book is to show that Jesus has been misunderstood on all sides. The Jews naturally misrepresented him in one sense, the Christians in another. To use the author's favorite word, which it is to be hoped is his own invention, Jesus has in one sense or another been "talmudised."

Having said something of the ingenuity of Rendel Harris, it is natural to show how this quality is displayed in Dr. Burch. The great difficulty he discovers in the Lord's promise to Peter that the Gates of Hades should not prevail against the Church. But why Gates (πύλαι)? "It was against the idea of a gate to believe that it could advance. Such a fracture of metaphor was not in harmony with the most lithe use of imagery which is exhibited in all the sayings of Jesus." So some seem to have assumed that He must have said not πύλαι but πηγαί. This does not satisfy Dr. Burch, nor any reasonable person. The papyri give the solution. "During the first two centuries of the Christian era, when a writer wanted to inscribe on papyrus a final Greek *a* to a word, and particularly if that same letter was the first of the next word to be written, he made a short horizontal or tooth-like stroke over or from the head of the letter which was the last but one in the first word." Thus we add an *a* to πύλαι and get πύλαϊα. Dr. Burch says this word is used by Plutarch in the sense of a promiscuous heaping up. Here it means the generation of the dead heaped above one another. The significance of the saying is that the congregation of the dead shall not prevail over the congregation, or *ecclesia*, of the living! Plutarch's employment of the word is interesting: he applies it to the historian Ctesias' use of incredible fables (μύθων ἀπιθάνων, *Vita Artaxerxis*, c. 1).<sup>1</sup>

The final chapter is of much interest to students of Josephus; as Dr. Burch appeals for consideration of the Old Slavonic version, in which there is a reference to Jesus not in the *Antiquities* but in the *Jewish War*. He conjectures that this version is a translation of the book Josephus said he wrote in Aramaic and sent to the 'barbarians up country,' meaning the non-Greek

<sup>1</sup> Πύλαϊα means, according to Lidell and Scott, "the meeting of the Amphictyonic council at Pylae." Also "nonsense," or "crowds." The Dictionary charitably hopes that the 'nonsense' was talked by the concourse which the council attracted. One's experience of representatives of States in modern countries makes one wonder if the 'nonsense' was not talked by the Amphictyons themselves.



speaking Jews in the Roman and Parthian empires. The Aramaic work survived in the remoter East, and was brought to Russia, possibly by Turkish Chazar merchants, and was translated into Old Slavonic. Dr. Burch makes a strong plea for the view that the Slavonic additions to the *Jewish War* concerning the Baptist and Jesus are genuine, and not interpolations. The question is one on which far more evidence than is at present forthcoming is required, before a final decision can be arrived at. Certainly a good deal of interesting matter is introduced into the chapter before us, notably Giraldus Cambrensis' visit in the twelfth century (not eleventh as is stated) to Robert of Cricklade, Prior of St. Frideswide's Priory, now Christ Church, Oxford. Robert collected Hebrew manuscripts of Josephus and notes that in some the passage about Jesus had been expunged.

One question suggests itself. Josephus says he had sent the account of the Jewish War, which he subsequently translated for his Roman readers into Greek, to the Jews in the East. Now the *Jewish War* begins with the days of Antiochus Epiphanes, sketches the period till the days of Herod the Great rapidly, gives a detailed account of this king's reign, and then hastens on till the outbreak of the actual war in A.D. 66. This was told for the benefit of the historian's Roman readers. Would it not have been superfluous to give oriental Jews this summary of Jewish history which in the Slavonic version includes the mentions of John the Baptist and Jesus? Surely the story of the war would naturally have begun with the procuratorship of Cestius Gallus. At any rate whether one agrees with Dr. Burch or not, his book has given cause to think furiously, and revise many preconceived opinions.

F. J. FOAKES JACKSON

*The Johannine Writings.* By J. Estlin Carpenter. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927, pp. xii + 493. \$7.50.

Dr. Carpenter has made a notable contribution to the rapidly swelling flood of works on the Johannine literature. A place has long existed for just such a book—one which would take the whole Johannine field for its domain, deal competently

with the several writings in relation not only to one another but to the milieu out of which they sprang and to the literary and religious *genres* to which they belong, face the psychological problems which they raise (more important than the problem of authorship), and, finally, give such an account of their essential teaching as to do justice both to their original purpose and their abiding worth. This broad and mature treatment of one of the most fascinating but perplexing portions of the New Testament is further enhanced by a restrained and judicial attitude towards all debatable points coupled with an easy, fluent style.

The authorship question is not allowed to ride the writer's pen. The cornerstone of his position here is the impossibility of ascribing the Apocalypse and the Gospel to the same hand. Both writers were Jews but one "approaches the fundamental questions of religion from the Hebrew side, the other from the Greek." Hence the necessity of distinguishing between John the Seer (or the Prophet), the author of the Apocalypse, and John the Elder, author of the Gospel and First Epistle as well as of 2 and 3 John. Yet "if the Elder John belonged to Ephesus" (Bishop or Pastor of the Church there?) "John the Seer could not have lived far off." With all their wide divergence they reflect a similar background of life and teaching. Neither is to be identified with the Apostle though the Elder may have introduced the Apostle into the Gospel "pneumatically" under the figure of the Beloved Disciple.

Partition theories as applied to the Apocalypse find little favor. Though the Apocalypse employs "different eschatologic presentations conceived at different times" they have been given the impress of a single mind. It is somewhat otherwise with the Gospel, which, though it does not lend itself to any such documentary analysis as the Pentateuch for example, is in its final form the result of a process of unknown length in which more than one hand has shared. It describes and enshrines the solemn experiences of a community—a Fellowship of believers "united by a common faith in brotherly discipleship," the group more di-

rectly addressed in 1 John. Inner inconsistencies of various sorts have survived (or been caused by) the process of editing. The Prologue is an afterthought rather than the point of departure of the book.

The Apocalypse belongs to the genus Prophecy. It gives rise however to psychological problems of its own which gain light from experiences as widely remote as those of Dante, Bunyan and George Fox. It is at once a work of inspiration and "the result of a literary process, founded on different sources, spread over many years." The Gospel is more difficult to classify. It "belongs neither to History nor to Biography, but to the Library of Devotion" (Streeter). It is however also a work of the imagination. Having the form of history it is in reality "super-historic," which is not the same as to say with Dr. Nolloth (*The Fourth Gospel*) that the Evangelist "has spiritualized historic fact without impairing its actuality." Here again we have to do with "visions" of a sort, whose sources, though in many cases traceable to the Synoptics or to S. Paul, may in others lie in "regions beyond the range of Christian thought."

The abiding value of the Apocalypse lies in the fact that the Seer of Patmos, "using the figures of tradition, and applying them to the circumstances of his day, gave the most concrete shape to the deepest yearnings of human nature and the perpetual tragedy of our experience." The Fourth Gospel is "the last word of Christian idealism." "Beyond the conflicts of time it points to the eternal victory of Truth and Love."

The book is enriched on every page with Dr. Carpenter's wide learning in the field of comparative religion. It is this which constitutes his special competency and gives to his work a tact and a perspective but scantily indicated in this review.

C. B. HEDRICK

*The Aim of Jesus Christ.* By William Forbes Cooley. New York: Macmillan, 1925.

"This study of the purpose of Jesus," says the author in the introduction, "is first of all an attempt to place the methods and

results of New Testament scholarship within reach of non-technical readers. . . . Beyond the critical and the historical, however, is the ethical aim of the book. It seeks by reconstructing Jesus' objective to throw a needed light on present-day issues, especially the problem of civilization, and the church's mission and duty." The critical attitude, we are told, consists in the application of two major principles—first, the "evidential primacy or eye and ear witnesses," and second, the principle of "positivism"—"the rule that empirical facts have a standing or basic authority which is not to be yielded to any ideas about them." The Jewish expectation of the Kingdom as the background of Jesus' teaching is sketched in an attractive and interesting way in the early chapters of the book, and the following chapters develop our Lord's own teaching about the Kingdom of Heaven. Going on from this point, the author mentions that the Kingdom idea was lost sight of by the early Church—witness the creed, for instance, which makes no mention of it. He accepts the view that the doctrine of the Atonement, the Sacraments, and much that goes to make up the Church as an institution, are additions to the original teaching of Christ from Hellenistic sources, partly through St. Paul, which to his mind seems to discredit them entirely. In a final chapter on "The Neglected Eucharist" he pleads for a return to the historic Christ. The Lord's Supper, with the words "Do this in remembrance of me," has been used, he says, as a magic rite. These words should rather be taken to remind us of the need of going back to Jesus and to his teaching.

One trouble with an approach like Dr. Cooley's is that it is difficult to draw the line between what are matters of fact and what are explanations in his sense. The Fourth Gospel, for instance, to his way of thinking, is almost all interpretation, and is practically ruled out as of no historic value. He shows an evident bias against the doctrine of the Incarnation, and a desire to picture our Lord as an ethical teacher and nothing more. Anything that sounds like a claim to special authority on our Lord's part he objects to because it seems inconsistent with his precon-

ceived ideas of what the nature of Jesus was. He says, for instance,

"The Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is occupied throughout with his own super-human position. He not only talks about himself over and over, but in the last analysis about little else. He is gracious, indeed, to his followers; but his grace is entirely contingent upon their belief in him as the Son of God."

One is tempted to ask why, if Jesus did not speak with any special authority, is it so important to find out just what he taught as distinguished from the other elements that came into Christianity later on. After all, there is a good deal to be said for the Church and for Catholic theology as a means of leavening society and deepening religious experience, whatever its origin was. If there is no divine origin about any of it, why not discuss frankly the relative value for human betterment of the Church as opposed to the somewhat hard-to-define teaching of the historic Christ? That this problem is not raised is due to the fact that the author has a typical Protestant bias made up of a not very commendable prejudice against the historic Church, and an altogether admirable loyalty to Jesus and to the ideals for which he is supposed to have stood. Dr. Cooley seems to be in the uncomfortable position of many Protestant modernists, who cling unconsciously to an inherited belief in Jesus as the Christ, and spend their conscious moments demolishing the basis for that faith. May the time come when they will realize the evidential value of their unconscious loyalty. CHARLES L. STREET

*The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin. A Historical and Critical Study.*

By Norman Powell Williams. New York: Longmans, 1927, pp. xxxv + 571. \$7.50.

The Bampton Lectures for 1924 are a work of the most profound and painstaking historical research, tracing in detail the origin, development, formulation, and decline of the twin ideas named in the title, together with an arresting attempt to state the essential doctrine they contain in new terms satisfactory to the requirements of modern science and philosophy. Three outstanding features in the work guarantee, at the outset, a fresh treat-

ment, and one that goes to the very roots of the problem: From the very beginning the outlook is thoroughly philosophical; the author is concerned with theology, with metaphysics, not merely with history of doctrine or of religious literature or ideas. The ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin are to be understood against the background of the world-wide, world-old Problem of Evil. They represent one of the three classical solutions of that problem; the others are the theory of 'unmoral monism,' according to which good and evil are alike appearances of the Absolute (Hinduism), and dualism, in which good and evil are co-eternal (later Mazdeism and Manicheism). In the next place, as a method of delimiting the field for investigation, the Vincentian Rule (*quod semper*, etc.) is adopted as a *scientific* criterion, and the author proceeds to inquire just how much and what kind of Fall-doctrine and doctrine of Original Sin the Catholic faith includes: *i.e.*, in what sense and degree these two ideas are a part of the Christian faith. With this criterion in mind, the author traces the history of the ideas in his first six chapters; the last two discuss their reinterpretation and permanent validity. In the third place, the psychological roots of the doctrines are thoroughly recognized: men speculated in these fields, or accepted the speculations of others, not because there was any clear statement of a Fall of Man or of Original Sin to be found in Revelation, but because penitence for sin and the consciousness of its prevalence in society drove them to posit some historical origin (in a world belonging to God, and created by Him) of the universal malady.

Two possible points of origin were suggested in the group of myths taken over by the writers of Genesis: Adam's sin in the garden, and the lust of the angels (ch. vi). Both theories, based upon these identifications, ran rival courses in the Pseudepigraphical Literature of the Maccabæan age and later, the Adam-theory gradually supplanting the other and, through St. Paul, becoming in time the prevailing one in Christian thought. At the same time a third theory, psychologically sounder than either, but unfortunately not very influential upon early Christianity, was advanced by the Rabbis—the official Jewish theological doctrine, as



contrasted with the popular pseudepigraphical doctrine rooted in folklore. This is the doctrine of the 'evil imagination,' *yēçer hara'*, which, along with the 'good imagination,' has been implanted in each individual at birth. Our Lord apparently made no choice between the doctrines, and it is possible that his Galilean followers and apostles were unfamiliar with the rabbinic doctrine. Popular satanism and demonology took the place, for them, of speculative explanations of sin and evil.

The course of the ideas in early Christian history, after St. Paul, was a contest between the 'once-born' and the 'twice-born' versions of the Fall-doctrine, the latter triumphing in St. Augustine's defeat of Pelagius. This victory was, however, dearly bought, as was made clear in the revival of Augustinianism by the Protestant Reformers (after it had been quietly but more and more effectively shelved by Catholicism for ten centuries). The decline of the Calvinistic-Augustinian theory at the present, its comparatively narrow limits in the West even at the time of its fullest development, its failure to impress the Orthodox East, all indicate—by the Vincentian Canon—that the 'twice-born' doctrine has not oecumenical validity. It is no part of the 'Catholic' faith. And it is to the ancient Greek theology, rather than to Western, Augustinian, Mediæval, or Protestant, that the church of the future will probably turn for its formulation of the traditional Christian explanation of the Beginning of Sin and the Origin of Evil.

The last two lectures contain the author's tentative 'reinterpretation' of the doctrines: Lecture vii is entitled "'Original Sin" Re-interpreted,' Lecture viii 'The Ultimate "Fall."' The irreducible minimum or 'Catholic' doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin can be set forth in a series of propositions:

1. God is infinitely good, and therefore the world as He made it must have been purely good, including no element of evil at all. . . .
2. The origin of evil is therefore to be sought in the voluntary rebellion of some finite or created will or wills, such rebellion having taken place *prior* to the appearance of the human species on this planet. . . .
3. Man, at his first entry into this world, was in moral and intellectual stature a babe, created frail, imperfect, ignorant, and non-moral, but endowed

with self-consciousness and the power of self-determination, which constituted his starting-point for progress and upward evolution. (The 'irreducible residuum' does not contain the Rabbinical and non-Scriptural idea of 'Original Righteousness,' the abandonment of which abolishes the apparent conflict between the Fall-doctrine and the evolutionary view of human history.)

4. The growth of man's moral ideas brought in its train some action whereby man aligned himself with the revolting power, partially identified himself with the forces of Evil, and entered upon a path largely divergent from that straight upward road which God had meant him to follow. (In other words, the first sin was not so much a 'Fall' as a failure to climb, or, more exactly, to climb as directly and perpendicularly as God desired. It will therefore be well to avoid using the term 'Fall' with reference to the first *human* sin, and to keep it for designating the ultimate pre-cosmic revolt, whatever that may have been. The term 'Fall,' again, is non-Biblical.)

5. Ever since this first transgression, human nature has displayed an inherent moral weakness or bias towards sin. . . .

6. This innate bias or tendency towards evil is the effect and symptom of 'weakness of will,' or defective control of the lower emotional and instinctive nature by the higher self. (Since Catholic or universal acceptance cannot be claimed for the specifically Augustinian or Western ideas of 'seminal identity,' 'Original Guilt,' and the intrinsic sinfulness of 'concupiscence,' all these ideas, consequently, go by the board. And the term 'Original Sin' itself is non-Biblical, and inextricably associated with the idea of 'Original Guilt'—a better term would be 'inherited infirmity'.)

7. This quality of 'weakness of will' inheres in the human stock as a hereditary character transmitted from parent to offspring through biological and not merely through social heredity.—As inherited and not wilful, it cannot be thought of as deserving God's 'wrath.'

This 'inherited infirmity' is identified with the inherited weakness of 'the herd-complex' and a place is found for it alike in individual and social psychology. Whether the psychologist will find the theological hypothesis of value as an account of the origin of this weakness—whose tragic actuality all history and all daily life alike attest—is another matter. Is not the whole 'Fall'-doctrine merely a symbol for an undeveloped state of social-mindedness—*i.e.*, a symbol of the *fact* rather than an explanation of it? However, we are dealing with theology, and re-interpreting a theological doctrine, and questions of validity must not, at this point, be mixed up with questions of interpretation.

'The Ultimate "Fall"' (Lect. viii) takes us back to Plato, Plotinus, and Origen, and presents us with what cannot be thought of much less than as a *cosmic* 'fall.' (Kant's theory,

and Hegel's—both of them rather poor exhibitions in Theology—are rightly dismissed as, respectively, too Manichæan and too monistic.) Driven by logic to posit 'a single, collective Fall in time,' yet prior to man—since the evil in the whole of the animate creation must be accounted for, and the arrested development of the 'herd-instinct' not only in man but in species below man—the author assumes 'a pre-cosmic vitiation of the Life-Force, at the very beginning of cosmic evolution.'

"This, . . . and not the failure of primitive man to *escape* from already existing evil, is the true and ultimate 'Fall.' Such a view of the Fall and its effects," he adds, "is much vaster and more awe-inspiring than that which makes it a purely human affair; and it proportionately increases the amplitude and magnificence of Redemption."

The author's final conclusion, therefore, as well as his initial outlook, is thoroughly philosophical. This is its strength and this is its weakness. (i) The mythological aspect of the theory, reminding us of the Gnostics, and especially of Marcion, may be overlooked. Not even Science, when it deals in ultimates, can escape the necessity of using such language, *i.e.*, using it symbolically. Of course the symbol is deliberately chosen, and is steadily recognized for what it is—*nur ein Gleichnis*. (ii) The author's theory presupposes the philosophical theory of Vitalism, and here the symbolism is more seriously taken than a goodly number of scientists and philosophers of the present are willing to allow. Is there such a thing as a 'Life-Force'? And if there is, is 'it' conscious, free, capable of choosing good or evil, in other words a 'free moral agent'? (iii) More serious is the situation for Ethics, if 'the Ultimate Fall' be what our author supposes. What hope is there for goodness in man if Sin is thus written into the constitution of things, if evil forces gained control before man emerged? Man must partake of evil as well as good, from the very first, since all that goes before conditions in some degree all that follows after, in evolution. This comes close to making sin inevitable, 'a necessary phase of the soul's evolution' as Hegel held; and if not pure Dualism is at least a *practical* Dualism as evil as Kant's. (iv) Finally, for Theology,

*i.e.*, for Christology, the theory of an evil World-Soul is particularly obnoxious. The World-Soul (= 'the Life-Force') is carefully distinguished from the Logos, as 'the created *anima mundi*, and yet it proceeds to assume the functions, in Creation and Evolution, of the other. Contrary to the purest form of the doctrine of the Logos, that found in the early Greek Theology, the finite and created World-Soul is no more than a double of the divine Logos, and chiefly distinguished as evil. "Before man was, the Spirit of Christ was striving with the evil in nature;" but the nerve of Christ's relation to that nature has already been cut—a relation which for Athanasius, *e.g.*, was of paramount importance. To all intents and purposes we are caught, all life is caught, God the Creator is caught in a maelstrom of Dualism; Evil has entered into and corrupted the very nature of the universe. Apparently, God was unable or unwilling to foresee or to forestall the tragic denouement (unless the rather strained paradox of 'O felix culpa' be taken as a plain tale of sober fact).<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Williams has written the standard *history* of the Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin; he has advanced a *theory* which must be reckoned with in all future discussion of the doctrines—

<sup>1</sup> *Quant à Science*, if I may add only a footnote from that point of view, one wonders whether the radical evil often attributed to nature by theologians, poets, and humanists generally is really there. Dean Church once confessed that the very thought of the sufferings of the lower animals affected him with something like acute vertigo; and the lines of his contemporary, the great Victorian laureate, are well known. Dr. Williams appears to share this view of the sufferings of the lower creation; and it tallies well with such a theological outlook as that, say, of St. Paul. But the actual, rather than the imagined, responses of animals to misfortune do not impress us in this way. That we are in grave danger of falling into 'the pathetic fallacy,' in this matter, has been pointed out by Canon Raven, who is a naturalist as well as theologian, in his recent Hulsean and Noble Lectures on *The Creator Spirit*. Beside which we may set the testimony of William Beebe, the American naturalist, a man who has lived as 'close to nature' as anyone in our generation: "I am never conscious of the bloody fang, the poison tooth, of the wilderness" (*Jungle Peace*, p. 154). There is undeniably real pain, acute suffering, and genuine 'evil' in nature; some of it, but by no means much of it, is caused or has been caused by man; but I greatly doubt if there is enough 'evil' in nature to require our assuming it to be a corruption of the 'Life-Force,' a failure or weakness in the *élan vital* or World-Soul 'in whom all things consist.'

his work, together with that of Dr. F. R. Tennant, is the *point du départ* for the modern study of the subject; he has introduced a number of careful 'discriminations,' as Baron von Hügel was wont to designate them, *e.g.*, the terms 'Original Guilt,' 'Original Righteousness,' etc.; and one finishes the book with a feeling that he would like to agree with the author more fully than he does. Perhaps the author's best service is right here: he makes us aware of the *Tragweite*, the real sweep and bearing of these ideas. They are close to the verge of Dualism, of Gnosticism. How close? And how valid are such ideas still, in our modern religious, ethical, scientific world-view? Before we discard them for good (as many of us have done, certainly in our preaching and public instruction), let us make one more examination of them, as exact, as careful, as historically accurate and philosophically comprehensive as possible. For it may be that instead of superfluous *additamenta* to the Faith, they are a vital part of it, and without them other factors lose somewhat—perhaps much—of their significance. Dr. Williams has certainly made this clear, both for historical Protestantism as well as Catholicism: these doctrines seem to belong to the genuinely Christian 'envisagement of reality,' as our philosophers say. In some form or other—specifically, in the form he has outlined—they belong to the norm of Christian faith.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

*Augustinus. Eine Psychographie.* By Bernhard Legewie. Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber, 1925, pp. 134.

A careful study of Augustine's personal life and of the larger aspects of his teaching from the point of view of Augustine's own nature. A brief glance at the chapter headings will make this quite clear—The Personal History of Augustine; Psychological Unity Apparent in the Works of Augustine; Augustine's Personality and its Relationship to his Activity and his Teaching; An Analysis of Augustine's Personality; Bases of the Spiritual Building. Under these main headings comes a brief, but sufficient, outline of the main events of Augustine's career; a survey of the content of the *Confessions* and the *Retractions* and some

of the other principal works with a view to pointing out material that will illustrate the main thesis of the pamphlet; certain of the fundamental convictions of Augustine with a view to throwing light on the Christian conclusions to which he came; and an examination of his spiritual nature.

The *motif* that runs throughout the study as well as the conclusion to which the author comes is that Augustine's whole life, in spite of its apparent contradictions, reveals a certain kind of unity. A dualism is apparent everywhere; a moral heroism underlies the moral and religious results.

The little volume (for it is only 134 pages long) gains somewhat in interest in being written, not by a theologian, but by a physician, who has become interested in his subject from what one might almost call the standpoint of the pathologist. It may be that the author has not altogether grasped the fact that Augustine, before his conversion, was so altogether (and in a fairly high-minded way) wrapped up in himself that God must seem remote, and that, after his conversion, he was so altogether wrapped up in God that human nature must seem rather alien to the nature of God. Nevertheless he has mastered the unity of the life, and he has again emphasized the assertion that Augustine was *ein sittlicher Held*.

H. B. WASHBURN

*The Psychology of the Methodist Revival. An Empirical and Descriptive Study.* By Sydney G. Dimond. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1926, pp. xv + 296. \$3.50.

It is the fashion today to look at every subject from the point of view of psychology, and so it is not surprising to find a valuable and important historical study written with the aid of that popular science. But the psychological element does not bulk very large, not nearly so large as the reader naturally expects. The book gives an admirable account of the origin of Methodism, and a skilful and sympathetic interpretation of its main features, but while psychology is often mentioned, and is sometimes effectively used, the psychological student will add little to his knowledge from reading this book.



There is, however, an introduction which does deal with psychology; in fact it is a brief statement of what the various schools stand for, and touching what is particularly important in the study of revivals, crowd and social psychology, and the primary instincts.

It is well to note a few of the findings. In the first place Mr. Dimond, who has made an exhaustive study of the sources, particularly of Wesley's voluminous journals, finds that conversion was nearly always instantaneous. There may indeed be a period which might be called incubation, but the climax is momentary and complete. Again he finds that there is a marked ethical element along with the emotional. The feelings are deeply stirred, but there was always a conviction of the possibility of a holy life, and a determination to pursue it. Further, conversion did not belong to the period of adolescence, thus adding a correction to Starbuck, for vast numbers of adults underwent the change. When Wesley made his appeal, it was to a whole community, and the response was made by people of mature age as well as the young. Once Methodism was established, the elders were naturally already converts, and the appeal must be made chiefly to the young. But Mr. Dimond has made it clear that there is not much vital relation between adolescence and conversion.

The reader of this book will find an excellent account of the social conditions of England in the eighteenth century, conditions which made Wesley's great work so timely and possible, and of the vast importance of the Revival in the economic and religious development of the English people.

L. W. BATTEN

*1,000 City Churches. Phases of Adaptation to Urban Environment.* By H. Paul Douglass. New York: Doran, 1926, pp. 380. \$4.00.

"The City Church" is not all it is "cracked up to be." This is the general impression one carries away from the perusal of Mr. Douglass' book on 1,000 city Churches.

"The typical city Church," he says, "is by no means a commanding institution. It is rather a one-story affair in a skyscraper environment. It is not the vast building and thronging congregation which country people are likely

to imagine. If they knew the average city Church as it really is, they would be sorry for it, and say, 'Poor little city Church.'".

In this ponderous, tedious and technical volume of 380 pages Mr. Douglass gives a report of an investigation of 1,044 non-Roman Churches in cities of 100,000 population made during a period of three years by a committee under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Religious Research. Among the Churches coöperating were the Baptist, Congregational, Methodist Episcopal, Presbyterian and Episcopal Communions. This study does not aim to give direct help to the city pastor in the solution of his problems. Its purpose is to present a more complete statistical generalization than has yet been made of city churches and to make available data for a point of departure for further studies. The average reader is likely to be disappointed if he is looking for a judgment on what is good or bad in the city Church. He will only find recorded what is more or less characteristic. If he is patient enough to study the tables carefully, he may discover norms for current judgment and future control of Church life. Because of its technical character the book will be appreciated more by the specialist on the urban Church problem than anyone else.

The main hypothesis of the book is that the city Church is an evolved rural Church. What it has come to be is the result of an evolution from a rural parent stock. Its immediate ancestor is the town Church. Some city Churches date back to the time when the city was still a village and have never grown out of their early village attitudes. Others were formerly in villages surrounding cities and have been annexed. Still others have been newly organized to meet the needs of incoming rural people. But in every case we witness the gradual urbanization of the originally rural Church. Although naturally a conservative institution the Church does for the most part respond slowly to the pressure of city life. Greater complexity of organization and wider range of service are the general symptoms of it.

From the scientific standpoint the most important contribution the book makes is the method of accurately measured classifica-

tion of Churches according to the degree of urban adaptation. The resulting classification is as follows:

1. The "unadapted" type, which is to be regarded as essentially the hold-over of a rural institution which has not begun to make distinctive urban adjustments.
2. The "slightly adapted" type, which is the product of a struggle between traditional and novel forces resulting in a small degree of adaptation.
3. The "internally adapted" type, which is the Church committed to urban attitudes and adaptation but limiting their organized expression primarily within its own institutional sphere and with respect to its own constituency.
4. The "socially adapted" type, which molds itself upon phases of service to the city beyond its original constituency and frequently adopts a special constituency on the grounds of its acute social need.

Instead of taking the most successful examples and measuring down from them the present study starts with the central tendency of the entire group of Churches as expressed in the most frequent and characteristic type. This is found in the "slightly adapted" group.

As a by-product of the study we find a composite picture of the city Church. It may be a shock to find that it is only a small organization of from one to two hundred members. It is about twenty-five years old and has been in its present location even a shorter period. Its pastor, a college and seminary graduate with an experience in the ministry of from 20 to 30 years, gets a salary of from \$1,000 to \$2,000 (exclusive of parsonage). The annual budget of current expenses is from \$2,000 to \$3,000 and the annual contributions to benevolences \$200. The Sunday School has an enrollment of from 100 to 200. The reason why this composite picture of the city Church differs so radically from our general impression of the city Church is because the few successful, outstanding city Churches overshadow the many struggling little Churches.

"In more than one half of its area," says Mr. Douglass, "the city Church is not urbanized. It reflects the newness of the city and the disinclination of the ecclesiastical organization to change—also the relative total weakness of Protestantism and its extreme divisions and over-small local units."

No, the city Church is not a "commanding institution" in the light of this investigation. The situation is not entirely due to

lack of adaptive development but partly due to the fact that Churches decay as well as develop. The type of a given Church must be determined therefore "primarily with reference to its degree of development beyond a rural parent stock in the effort to adapt itself to the city, or in terms of its retrogression from some previous peak of its own evolution."

This volume is indeed a valuable contribution to the study of the urban problem and forms one of a series of important studies for which we are greatly indebted to Mr. Douglass and his colleagues.

THOMAS S. CLINE

## BOOKS RECEIVED

### Old Testament; Judaism

*Prophecy and Eschatology.* By Nathaniel Micklem. London: Allen & Unwin, 1926, pp. 248. 7 s. 6 d.

Old Testament prophecy is an extremely difficult subject to treat with much assurance to-day, if the aim is to discuss the particular prophets whose names are known, for scholars hold very divergent opinions as to what is genuine. For example, let anyone arrange to take as genuinely Isaianic only what all the leading authorities accredit to that prophet, and he will find his result nearly a blank, for there is hardly a passage that is not questioned by some competent scholar. It is impossible to see a way out of this difficulty. Once admit, as we must admit, that later additions have been made to the prophetic books, and it is open to anyone to question any passage.

Mr. Micklem has written an excellent little book, but he has undertaken to set forth the eschatological teaching of particular prophets, Elijah, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Therefore he must first establish the genuineness of the passages upon which he bases his conclusions. And it is precisely in the eschatological passages where the doubt of authorship becomes strongest. As long as a prophet is dealing with contemporary events, there is a possible check in the history of his times. But once he begins to dream dreams of a remote future, if indeed the great prophets ever do, there is nothing to fix the date from which the oracle sprang, and not much to indicate the author in whose mind it arose. Mr. Micklem is quite at home with the works of the leading scholars, and has a critical faculty of his own, but it must be evident that on the whole his work can have little more weight than his personal opinion.

It is surprising to find that the author has slipped when he had firm ground to tread. In treating the story of Ahab's campaign against Ramoth-gilead (1 Ki. 22), after citing the oracle of Ahab's four hundred prophets, he says: "But the kings are not quite satisfied; they want to hear what Micaiah ben Imlah has to say; he has a reputation for being a gloomy prophet." Now, as a matter of fact, Ahab was quite satisfied, and he certainly did not want to hear what Micaiah had to say. It was Jehoshaphat only who was not satisfied with the oracle of the prophets who so evidently said what Ahab wanted, and apparently he had never heard of the son of Imlah. Moreover, all we know of Micaiah's reputation is that he never said anything good about Ahab, but it does not follow that he was a gloomy prophet. L. W. B.

*A Grammar of Mishnaic Hebrew.* By M. H. Segal. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1927, pp. xliii + 248 (15 s.).

It is fortunate that the only grammar of the Mishna available to English students is the exhaustive and reliable one before us. It is fortunate also that

the author has presupposed Dr. Cowley's edition of Gesenius-Kautzsch, which it closely follows in arrangement and terminology. Hence the student familiar with Biblical Hebrew will have little difficulty in grasping at once the differences in grammar, syntax, idiom and vocabulary which confront him in the Mishna.

In a valuable Introduction Mr. Segal advances weighty arguments to demonstrate 'the organic connexion of the Mishnaic dialect with Biblical Hebrew, and its relative independence of contemporary Aramaic, at least in the field of grammar.' This is an extremely important matter, as it challenges the now popular view of the prevalence of Aramaic, and to some degree brings in question the contemporary criticism of I Enoch and other Pseudepigrapha, the Book of Acts, and in general the Aramaic background of the Synoptic Gospels (including the apocalyptic-eschatological interpretation of 'Son of Man'). Galilee undoubtedly spoke Aramaic, but the center of Jewish life in Palestine was Jerusalem and Judea, where Mishnaic Hebrew (MH) was the spoken language. If Segal is right, the use of Aramaic in strictly *Judean* documents needs the very strongest kind of proof.

His conclusion is "that MH had an independent existence as a natural living speech, growing, developing, and changing in accordance with its own genius, and in conformity with the laws which govern the life of all languages in general, and the Semitic languages in particular. It was greatly influenced by Aram., its close neighbor and rival, but it was not submerged by Aram. till after some centuries, when political factors made it impossible for MH to continue as a living speech."

#### New Testament

*An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament.* By A. H. McNeile.  
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, Am. Branch, 1927, pp. 478. \$6.50.

Two volumes have thus far appeared in the Bishop of Gloucester's 'Oxford Handbooks of Theology,' viz., Dr. Selbie's *Psychology of Religion* (1924) and the present volume. The editor's *Christian Theology* and Dr. Watson's *History of Christian Persecution* are announced as in preparation.

Dr. McNeile's *Introduction* is a good summing-up of present-day positions, with the balanced, sane, constructive outlook characteristic of his writings. Most of the material presupposed in an intelligent survey of problems in an introductory course is given, together with the author's interpretation of its significance. Streeter's work on the Gospels is carefully treated, and such a volume as Burney's *Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*, or Oman's *Book of Revelation*, is explained in detail and with painstaking care. On the other hand some recent works seem completely to have eluded the author's attention, e.g., Burton's *Galatians*, Easton's *St. Luke*, Scott's *Hebrews*. Somewhat the same is true of the chapter on Textual Criticism, which is undoubtedly one of the best brief accounts of the subject ever published. It leads up to Westcott and Hort, whose work is thoroughly explained, and gives an account of British and American studies since their date; but there is not even a mention of Von Soden. His textual theories may not be convincing; but even a brief introduc-



tory account might well at the least give a reference to him. Moreover, some of the statements made were out of date before the book was published: *e.g.*, Dr. Torrey (p. 35) is at Yale, not Andover; Dr. Merrill (p. 36) has retired; President Burton (p. 60) is no longer living; etc. In a word, the work is characteristically British: solid, painstaking, intensive rather than extensive, a trifle insular, not exhaustive in range but absolutely thorough on the ground it covers, summing up in a few words many pages of discussion, and briefly giving the author's reasons for preferring the solution he sets forth—*e.g.*, the authorship of *John*, or the geography of *Galatians*. Much of this will be of immense advantage in the class-room and in the minister's private study. One wants to know present-day positions, and the reasons therefor, simply and clearly set forth. It is not too much to say that the latest N. T. Introduction is also the best, and that it is likely to be as useful today as was the famous work by an earlier Dublin professor, Dr. Salmon, in its generation.

*Was Jesus an Historical Person?* By Elwood Worcester. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926, pp. viii + 79. \$1.25.

Two discourses delivered in Emmanuel Church, Boston, outlining and refuting the arguments of such men as William Benjamin Smith, Arthur Drews, Kalthoff, Jensen and others who have denied the existence of Jesus as an historical person. The occasion was the (then) recent deposition of Bishop Brown. Written in a lively and entertaining style, and useful as a popular apologetic wherever the ghost of this baseless controversy has to be laid.

C. B. H.

*Das Weltbild Jesu.* By Wilhelm Schubart. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1927, pp. 54. M. 2.

The series formerly appearing as 'Beihefte zum Alten Orient' is now published independently under the title 'Morgenland: Darstellungen aus Geschichte und Kultur des Ostens.' The editor of the series, Prof. Dr. Schubart of Berlin, has written the present number, which undertakes to set forth the world-view of our Lord, his attitude toward history, current affairs, the world outside Palestine, his native land, his own people, the Kingdom of God, his own Person, mission, and career. The whole subject is studied in the light of contemporary study of the early Christian literature, of Oriental religion and social life. The treatment of Jesus' ethical teaching reminds one of Bultmann. There are many fine observations, though on one or two points—*e.g.*, the minimizing of the Lucan, the maximizing of the Marcan narrative; the Schweitzerian interpretation of Good Friday—we may hesitate to follow the author all the way.

*Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History.* By Adolf Deissmann. Tr. by William E. Wilson. Second edition, fully revised and enlarged. New York: Doran, 1927, pp. xv + 323. \$5.00.

Deissmann's great work on St. Paul has been out of print for some time, as was the German original until the new edition appeared in Germany in 1925.

The new English edition is an accurate translation of the new German edition, including the new plates and appendices. The work is too well known to require an extended notice. It is an indispensable work for anyone who wishes to grasp the modern conception of St. Paul—not the Theologian but the hero of religion, of spiritual, mystical Christianity, whose biography is a key to his theology, who deepened and enriched Gentile Christianity immeasurably and who, in spite of age-long misunderstandings, has never ceased to contribute richly to the spiritual life of later ages. Dr. Deissmann has done more than any other single author to acquaint the modern world with this St. Paul, the spiritual genius.

*Das Formgeschichtliche Problem des Neuen Testaments.* By Ludwig Köhler. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927, pp. 41. M. 1.50.

A lecture setting forth the principles of *Formgeschichte* as developed by Dibelius, Bultmann, and K. L. Schmidt, and providing a clear and interesting introduction to the subject and likewise a criticism making clear its definite limitations. The author insists that the problem of the N. T. is not one belonging to *Formgeschichte* but is still a historical-critical one.

*The Earliest Latin Commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul.* By Alexander Souter. New York: Oxford University Press, Am. Branch, 1927, pp. x + 244. \$5.00.

Professor Souter published the Introduction to his *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul* in the Cambridge 'Texts and Studies' in 1922. In 1924 he delivered a course of lectures on the early Latin commentators upon St. Paul at Princeton Theological Seminary. The published volume contains more material than the lectures as delivered, including word lists, tables of examples, etc., showing the style, Biblical text in use, or method of treatment by the various commentators. The subjects chosen are Marius Victorinus, 'Ambrosiaster,' Jerome, Augustine, and Pelagius.

It is not a common field in which the author has chosen to specialize, but one in which are to be found perhaps scarcely a half-dozen experts the world over. And although not many may be found to follow him at present, the revival of Patristic studies—in America notably at the Catholic University in Washington—will doubtless in time produce other scholars who will devote themselves to the same field. Meantime, whoever wishes to know about the early Latin exegesis of St. Paul will have to consult, *in primis*, this careful and authoritative work. That the study is not without reward, even a casual reading will make clear; and the author quite rightly maintains (p. 7) that "it can never cease to be of moment to the real lover of Scripture what was thought of its meaning by any patient investigator in any country or in any age."

## Church History

*Orbis Christianus Saec. I-V.* (Map.) By Karl Pieper. Düsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1927, M. 18; mounted, 36.

This is an extra large wall map (2.42 m. x 1.53 m.) showing graphically, by the use of colors, the successive stages in the spread of Christianity during the first five centuries. It not only takes the place of other maps, such as Deissmann's map of St. Paul's missionary work, appended to the first edition of *Paulus* and now unfortunately out of print, or von Harnack's series in his work on *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, small but invaluable; but it is really unique in kind. So far as we know, no such wall map has ever hitherto been prepared. Its archæology is reliable—where questions are not settled the editor indicates this with '?' or '??.' The editor has made a careful study of all the available data—lists of representatives at councils, acts of the martyrs and other early Christian literature, excavations, inscriptions, etc. For courses in the N. T., Early Church History, History of Missions, this map will soon become indispensable to those who use it.

*Die Forderung des Ehelosigkeit für alle Getauften in der alten Kirche.* By Karl Müller. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927, pp. 25. M. 1.50.

A lecture in which the famous Tübingen Professor of Church History traces the rise and spread of the ultra-ascetic teaching, reflected, *e.g.*, in Apoc. 14: 1-5, that all believers (or at least the enlightened, or the baptized, or the perfect) must be celibates. Our Lord made the requirement in certain exceptional cases; St. Paul, expecting the immediate end of the age, viewed this as almost the normal procedure for the Christian; the later schismatics, and many orthodox (esp. in Mesopotamia), influenced by Gnosticism, pressed on to the full and final conclusion—one which the American Shakers of the early nineteenth century revived.

*The History of the Franks by Gregory of Tours.* Tr. with an Int. by O. M. Dalton. Two vols. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, Amer. Branch, 1927, pp. xii + 447, 660. \$15.00.

Vol. II of this work contains the only complete English translation of Gregory's *History*, together with very full notes, and indices. The text upon which it is based is that of the French scholars, Omont and Collon, in the edition of M. René Poupardin (1913) with which these volumes are uniform in size. For historical purposes nothing can take the place of Gregory's work as a source for sixth century France.

Vol. I contains the Introduction, a series of studies of Gregory as a man and as a writer, the Merovingian Kingdoms, Church, and Social Life. Ch. iii, on the Merovingian Church, deserves to be placed with the recent posthumous work of Sir S. Dill on *Roman Society in Gaul*, and gives, in more than 140 pp., a detailed picture of conditions: the decline of civilization, the encroaching night of barbarism, the feebleness of the Church's spiritual control, the extent

of superstition, the desperate compromise forced upon religion and morality by the raw, crude energies of men in an unenlightened age. The church survived—that is a miracle greater than any of those which Gregory piously records. But it took many centuries to recover from the decline which not only Christianity but all Western civilization underwent in the dark period which was then setting in.

*Revolution und Reformation im XVI Jahrhundert.* By Hans von Schubert. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927, pp. 53. M. 1.50.

A thoroughly documented lecture giving the results of Prof. von Schubert's studies of Luther and the Peasants' Revolt. He distinguishes three stages in Luther's development as a reformer, and attributes the social phase of the Reformation to conditions that had long existed in S.W. Germany.

*The Colonial Church in Virginia.* By Edward L. Goodwin. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1927, pp. xxiv + 343, ill. \$6.00.

An interesting and readable account of the colonial Church in Virginia, in six chapters, with biographical sketches of the first six Bishops of the Diocese of Virginia and other historical papers. The latter includes an address on 'The First Convention,' delivered at Richmond in 1910, 'Early Missionary Activities in the South,' 'Two Pioneer Southern Bishops' (James H. Otey and Leonidas Polk), an annotated list of the Colonial Clergy in Virginia, a table of counties, parishes, and ministers, and a bibliography. The volume is well illustrated and forms a fine addition to the historical literature of the American Church. Bp. William C. Brown has written a Foreword, and the Introduction is from the pen of the Rev. G. M. Brydon. The editorial supervision, made necessary by the lamented death of Dr. Goodwin in 1924, has been carefully handled by his daughter, Miss Mary F. Goodwin.

*English Modernism. Its Origin, Methods, Aims.* By H. D. A. Major. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927, pp. 274. \$2.50.

The Noble Lectures at Harvard in 1925-26 were delivered by the Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford, and Editor of *The Modern Churchman*. No better exponent of English Modernism could have been chosen, and the published volume gives an interesting survey of the antecedents, earlier history, present extent and activities of the movement in the Church of England. As defined in these fourteen chapters, there is little to object against it, at least in the mind of an American churchman. Perhaps we are all 'Modernists,' over here! At least, some even of our 'Catholic' leaders would have little difficulty in qualifying for membership in the Churchmen's Union. The difficulty is that neither contending group sticks to its defined theological principles; each ceases too readily to be a movement and becomes a party; and when partisanship appears, Love, Wisdom, and even Sound Learning take their departure. (We refer, of course, only to conditions here, not in England.)

Rather than present his own views of the movement, exclusively, Dr. Major

has let his confreres speak for themselves. The result is an enormous catena of Modernist testimony, rather unfortunate for the literary style of the book but certainly adding to its authority as a statement of the Modernist position and point of view.

#### Philosophy; Systematic Theology

*Platons Dialektik des Seins.* By Joh. Theodorakopoulos. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927, pp. 96. M. 4.

A laborious critique of the later Platonic writings in an endeavor to discover the basic 'motives' in Plato's dialectic of 'real being.' The fundamental presuppositions are found in the Theory of Judgment, as it would now be called in Kantian terms—the Platonic distinction between the *Peras* and the *Apeiron*. Plato's doctrine of Logos, and the (relatively circumscribed) place of mysticism in thought, are matters of current interest described in the volume.

*The Works of Aristotle.* Translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Vol. VII. *Problemata.* By E. S. Forster. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927, pp. ix + 396 (15 s.).

The Oxford Aristotle is steadily nearing completion. Of the eleven volumes, eight have already been published; and all but four treatises, to appear in the remaining volumes, are now in print. The undertaking has been an enormous one. Never before has there been a complete English translation of the works of Aristotle; never, accordingly, since the days when Latin was the language of scholarship, have English-speaking students been in an equally favorable position to study the remains of Aristotle's teaching. The new translation will, we trust, mark the end of the eclipse under which the Father of Logic, of Biology, and of Psychology has lain since the Renaissance.

The *Problemata*, a minor and perhaps even 'junior' member of the Aristotelian corpus, has been dated as late as the fifth or sixth century A.D. Professor Forster admits that it shows 'gradual compilation by several hands,' and probably 'did not reach its final form until some time after the beginning of the Christian Era.' It no doubt contains an element derived from a genuine Aristotelian work, as well as betraying dependence upon other early writings of the school.

Its importance today is for the history of science. The work reads like the Collected Notebooks of an Early Naturalist! We scarcely realize what a vast amount of observation was necessary before physical science could arise, how slowly facts were verified (not to mention hypotheses, and laws!), with what painstaking care the very earliest investigators had to take the initial steps, and how gradually the modern scientific 'world-view' has come into existence. As a commonplace book of ancient science the Aristotelian *Problemata* enables us to reconstruct in imagination the more primitive world-view of the Græco-Roman world, of the Church Fathers, of the Stoic scientists, the Arabians, and the Schoolmen: an immensely important part of the background of theology and religious thought.

*Idealism as a Philosophy.* By R. F. Alfred Hoernlé. New York: Doran, 1927, pp. 330. \$2.50.

Professor Hoernlé is a teacher of philosophy who has not forgotten that it means first of all the love of wisdom. His constant aim is to make the subject clear and to show the reasonableness of the various doctrines under discussion. Not for him the delicate thrill of inventing a new terminology in each book he writes! The present volume is an enlargement and complete revision of his earlier *Idealism as a Philosophical Doctrine* (1924; already reviewed), and provides a "map" for the beginner in the field. Idealism is divided into Spiritual Pluralism, Spiritual Monism, Critical (or Kantian) Idealism, and Absolute Idealism. It is more than a history, and the analysis and criticism of modern and contemporary systems—e.g., Bradley, Bosanquet, Ward—is most valuable. A clear and interesting book which will be as useful to the general reader interested in philosophy as to the professional student.

*Duns Scotus.* By C. R. S. Harris. Two vols. New York: Oxford University Press, Am. Branch, 1927, pp. xii + 380, viii + 402 (42 s.).

Dr. Harris, who contributed the Essay on Mediaeval Philosophy in the recent Oxford volume, *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, and who has now produced the sole first-class work on Duns Scotus, happily combines English and American scholarship. He is Fellow of All Souls College and D.Phil. (Oxon.); in 1922-23 he was Visiting Fellow at Princeton and took his Ph.D. Parts of Vol. I, on the Place of Duns Scotus in Mediaeval Thought, formed his thesis at Princeton, Vol. II, on the Philosophical Doctrines of Duns, his thesis at Oxford. Such modern works as Grabmann's *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* and Gilson's *Études de Philosophie Médiévale* are presupposed and their positions frequently cited or summarized—or even criticized. But the main work of the author has been upon the sources, Duns Scotus' surviving *Opera*. Not the least valuable part of his contributions is the discussion of works attributed to Scotus and the publication, as an Appendix to Vol. II, of a series of *Quaestiones* and a tractate, *De Cognitione Dei*, which Dr. Harris believes should be added to the authentic writings of the Subtle Doctor. To which must be added the full quotations given in the footnotes. Since Duns' works are practically inaccessible to the majority of students, this is a very real help.

Vol. I is of wide general interest and should be read by every student of mediaeval thought or religion. The chapter on 'Faith and Reason in the Middle Ages' is a brilliant introduction to scholastic philosophy and theology, following which the chapter on 'The Relation between Philosophy and Theology in Duns Scotus' sets the subject of the study in his proper *milieu* and perspective. The traditional divergence and detailed contrasts between Duns and Thomas disappear, very largely. Their agreements were far profounder than their disagreements; though Duns' doctrine of the primacy of the Will, in contrast with Thomas' intellectualism, is clearly recognized, it must not be exaggerated. Duns shared in the revived Aristotelianism of his day, but not to the full ex-



tent to which St. Thomas adopted it did he lay himself open to its influences. The traditional modified Augustinianism of his order, the date at which he wrote, the influence of such mystical theologians as St. Bonaventura, Hugh and the Victorines, combined to steady him. For Duns, theology was throughout a *practical* rather than a speculative science. Hence Dr. Harris finds in Duns, rather than in Thomas, the real culmination of mediæval thought, both philosophical and theological. It would be easy to conclude, as many have already concluded, that modern Protestant, rationalistic (!), critical developments lay implicit in Duns' doctrines. Nothing could be farther from the truth—save as all developments 'go back' in some measure to their antecedents; neither Protestantism, Pragmatism, nor Voluntarist Psychology owe any particular debt to Duns, any debt, *i.e.*, that they do not also, more or less, owe to Aquinas, Anselm, Bonaventura, or others of the Schoolmen.

The only fair way to study a great thinker is in the light of his own times. Such a study Dr. Harris has given us. From it Duns Scotus emerges a more familiar, more attractive figure than he has been for centuries. In recognizing this we do not need to hail him as 'modern'—which is after all only a none too subtle way of complimenting ourselves; it is enough that he was great in his own time, a time from which our modern world has still something to learn. And for the student who would really know mediæval thought at first hand, these two volumes, taken along with one or two more one might mention, form a capital introduction, interesting, clear, and philosophically well grounded.

*Systematic Theology (Dogmatik)*. By Wilhelm Herrmann. Tr. by N. Micklem and K. A. Saunders. New York: Macmillan, 1927, pp. 152. \$1.50.

Wilhelm Herrmann was one of the outstanding Ritschlians of the past generation. His *Communion of the Christian with God* has been one of the most widely read and most influential books of that school, almost as influential in Britain and America as in Germany. The present volume represents his constantly revised *Diktate* in Dogmatics, the basis of his lectures on that subject—as is the German custom—and it was not published until after his death in 1922. Part I deals with Religion, as a science, its intellectual apprehension, its historical foundation, and the fundamental principles of the Christian religion; Part II takes up the Evangelical *Glaubenslehre* in detail. As a brief, clear statement of the Ritschlian position in doctrine the volume is a welcome addition to the literature of Systematics.

#### History of Religions

*Bilderatlas zur Religionsgeschichte*. Ed. by Hans Haas. Lfg. 8, 'Die Ainu und ihre Religion'; Lfg. 9-11, 'Die Religionen in der Umwelt des Urchristentums.' Leipzig: Deichert, 1925-1926, pp. xviii + 103 pll. and xxii + 192 pll. M. 10 and 12.80.

Dr. Haas, the editor of the series, and Dr. Joh. Leipoldt, have prepared, respectively, the two latest numbers of this valuable series. The student gains from these plates and their accompanying interpretation a vividness of impres-

sion otherwise impossible. They provide a most useful supplement to the textbooks, especially the Lehmann-Haas *Textbuch zur RG.*, and to any course of lectures upon History of Religions.

*Religionsgeschichte Europas.* By Carl Clemen. Vol. I. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1926, pp. vii + 383. M. 17 (bound, 19).

This volume is the first comprehensive study of Early European religion which takes into consideration recent anthropological and archeological discoveries. The author studies first the prehistoric religion from the paleolithic period to the La Tène culture. Then follows a survey of the religions of the non-Indoeuropeans and finally of the Indoeuropeans. Each section has an excellent working bibliography. There is a general index.

The illustrations are well selected. The work is done with great care and a good sense of proportion. The author is perfectly acquainted with each section of the field and knows his subject. It is an excellent piece of work. A second volume will cover the religions which still exist in Europe (not including the great universal religions such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism).

J. A. M.

#### Practical Theology

*Handbuch für das kirchliche Amt.* Ed. by Martin Schian. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1927, Lfg. i. 'Aachen-Bethel.' M. 2.60.

Not so ambitious as the *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, the new *Handbuch* is to be largely a Dictionary of Practical Theology with briefer supplementation from the fields of History, Biography, and Doctrine. That is, it will be technically a 'Parson's Handbook' in the widest professional sense: 'What every clergyman ought to know' . . . or to have within easy access! It appears to treat impartially Catholic (i.e., R. C.), Lutheran, and Reformed points of view, data, and history; and since the work will be complete in forty signatures, double column, quarto, it will supply for ready reference a mass of information now accessible only—if at all—in numerous encyclopædias, dictionaries, year books, and statistical reports. Cross references are given, and good bibliographies.

*The Great Physician.* Sel. and arr. by A. J. Gayner Banks and W. Sinclair Bowen. New York: Macmillan, 1927, pp. xvi + 196. \$2.00.

This is 'a Manual of Devotion for those who care for the sick,' compiled by the Mission Preacher to the National Cathedral and a well-known physician in Washington. It is really an anthology, drawn from Scripture, other collections, private sources, and the works of saints and poets. Its twofold dedication to the Guilds of St. Luke and St. Barnabas, and to other Christian physicians and nurses, indicates the point of view. It assumes the coöperation of priest and physician in the work of restoration and healing, not the supplanting of either by the other, and it is a volume that should soon become a vademecum of every pastor. After an Introduction on 'How to Visit the Sick' and on 'Self-

sacrifice and Intercession,' Part i deals with 'Silence and Meditation'; Pt. ii gives a large number of suitable prayers for various needs and in various emergencies; Pt. iii contains a number of Offices, followed, in Pt. iv, by a brief Meditation on the Sacraments, and prayers; Pts. v-vii contain quotations, appropriate Bible readings, and selected hymns.

*Conscience and Its Problems. An Introduction to Casuistry.* By Kenneth E. Kirk. New York: Longmans, 1927, pp. xxiv + 411. \$6.00.

It is coming to be fairly generally admitted that laxity of discipline is at the present day one of the Church's most serious weaknesses. What distinguishes a Christian's conduct from that of any other fairly good man or woman, decent citizen, member of the community, subscriber to the Red Cross and the Community Chest, and observer of ordinary business ethics?—The standard is only one of casual use and wont: *i.e.*, there is *no* recognized Christian standard, none founded upon deeply laid principles of religion or ethics. And when the new generation inquires, 'What authority has custom over us?' the weakness of our position appears at once. What we need is a thought-out, modern, positive, and tangible Moral Theology. Laxity in discipline reveals only too clearly the lack of intelligent instruction—*e.g.*, in the appalling conditions laid bare in the divorce courts; thousands of presumably Christian young men and women have undertaken the responsibilities of married life with scarcely a thought of the duties, the obligations, or the qualifications for that state. And no one, parent, pastor, or judge, ever troubled to teach them anything about it before they plunged into their 'sea of troubles.' Modern Protestantism certainly cannot escape culpability for this state of affairs (the older Protestantism, *e.g.*, in the days of Baxter, had a fairly comprehensive system of Moral Theology; popular Protestantism today has none). And although Rome has not been lacking in an ample casuistry, its teaching must be modernized and adapted to present-day conditions and requirements. Hence the widespread need for a thoroughly Christian, thoroughly scientific, positive Moral Theology.

In this important field there are so far only a few really competent workers, and among them few have made as important a contribution as Mr. Kirk. His earlier volume, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, was followed by one on *Ignorance, Faith and Conformity*. These, together with the present volume, have been grouped together as 'Studies in Moral Theology,' of which this is accordingly Volume III. Part i deals with 'Conscience and Casuistry,' defining them and their relation to each other, with a chapter (ii) on Loyalty, discussing the relativity of Moral Law and the concrete problems—involved in custom and 'reinterpretation'—of members of the Church of England. Part ii takes up various problems of Conscience, grouped under 'Error,' 'Doubt,' and 'Perplexity.' The author's position is a conservative one, which is natural, since radicals as a rule have little patience with such a field of investigation as casuistry. He is thoroughly at home in the historical and philosophical phases of his subject, and has produced a volume that is well suited for use as a text book. Casuistry he describes as 'simply equity operating on a large scale' (p.

125), a view which will help some readers—if there are any such—who question the necessity of the science. The point of view upon ‘re-interpretation’ is both refreshing and reassuring: “Nothing . . . can shake us in our conviction that the Church of England is as free as any other Christian body to go forward with the task of re-interpreting the legacy of the past. To do this will in no way be disloyal to the Catholic Church which is the whole Body of Christ. This is not to say that she is bound to be right in her re-interpretation. . . . To dethrone the infallibility of Rome is not to install that of Canterbury in its place” (p. 97). And the definition of Conscience could scarcely be improved: “Conscience is not something alien and external to myself; and the more I think of it as such the more I am apt to regard it as a tyrant whose rulings I must by hook or by crook evade. Conscience is just *myself*; not indeed my whole self—for (as I know only too well) I am not a unified personality, but a complex of contesting and only half-harmonised interests—but my best self, or my higher self, or my true self, or whatever other name I can employ to express the required meaning. To make conscience an *other* than myself is to identify myself with those lower motives against which my higher self is in arms; or at best to treat myself as the resultant and plaything of forces—conscience included—over which I have no control. The danger may not be a great one, but it is there. The exigencies of language force us often enough to speak of conscience as a distinct entity; but we must continually remind ourselves that it is no such thing. When conscience speaks, it is my own best self that speaks; when conscience blames, it is I who am feeling justifiable remorse. Conscience is myself in so far as I am a moral man; and the problems of conscience are simply the problems which the moral man has to solve in a moral way—using the reason which God has given him to discover the path of duty through the obscurities which conceal it from view” (pp. 56 f.).

*Meditation and Mental Prayer.* By Wilfred L. Knox. New York: Gorham, 1927, pp. vii + 151. \$1.50.

A wise and simple little book which will be useful to many. The author says it is “intended for beginners,” but most of us are beginners, in practising the great art of worship, and through the simplicity is evident much experience in training the activities of the interior life. The book suggests the fact that the Christian, in his modesty, knows a good deal more than the psychoanalyst concerning the salutary discipline of consciousness. Christian leaders in charge of souls were occupied in studying the mind and regulating its queer behavior, centuries before psychology was heard of.

Some statements might be challenged. Surely, meditation does not begin with “consecutive reasoning”—which suggests an argumentative frame of mind—but rather with analytical reflection or recognition. It is strange to find no treatment of intercession or thanksgiving, as component factors in mental prayer; for both help to deliver from the peril of spiritual self-culture, and can lead straight to those acts of the will which are rightly described as the goal to which all intellectual activity must tend. But one book can not say everything, and this is a very practical little work.

Is it unprofitable to suggest that Christian meditation may be based on other things than the Scriptures?—on some wonder of science, on the beauty of some natural form, on some revelation of God in the lives of His saints. All natural knowledge can be transmuted into spiritual vision, and used to quicken religious passion and resolve; and such extension of the range of devotional exercises might be helpful to many Christian people. v. d. s.

*Man and Society.* By George M. Janes. Menasha, Wis.: Collegiate Press, 1927, pp. 104. \$75.

The lectures that go to make up this book were originally delivered in 1925 at Bangor Theological Seminary. They discuss in popular and readable form the "Social Gospel," the development of the social sciences and their relation to each other, the history of the development of human society, and certain aspects of society as we know it today. Dr. Janes is a discriminating and acute observer of present day social and economic conditions in America, and is at his best in this field. The lecture on "Social Aspects of Rural Life" in this volume is particularly good. What he has to say about religion, while all true and doubtless valuable when the lectures were given, has been said better and more convincingly elsewhere. The last chapter, on Fundamentalism, is of interest chiefly on account of the attitude of mind it reveals in certain religious circles in the more remote parts of the State of Maine. c. l. s.

*Humanist Sermons.* Ed. by Curtis W. Reese. Chicago: Open Court, 1927, pp. xviii + 262. \$2.50.

'Humanism' is the name adopted for their views by a group of ultra-left-wing Unitarian ministers in this country for whom even belief in God seems too dogmatic and confining. Their attitude is 'wistful, hopeful, expectant'; 'not that of denial . . . but of inquiry.' "The Humanist is questful; but if the quest be found fruitless he will still have his basic religion intact, viz., the human effort to live an abundant life" (pp. vii f.).

One is inevitably saddened, on reading this volume, not by the 'unorthodoxy' of it—for such considerations would be puerile when men are founding a religion without even a God—but by the very 'wistfulness' of its outlook which the editor admits. It is so thin, so cold, so lacking in *human* fire and warmth, in the vigor of a living faith and hope, that the future of such a point of view seems somewhat questionable. One cannot help sympathizing with their reactions against the 'vulgar' Protestantism now in its decline—and hence less attractive than ever—in America; but if only these men could catch something of the contagious vigor, not to say thoroughly human warmth, of traditional, historical, Catholic Christianity, what a message they might have!

*Ritual Notes.* By J. Nelson Burrows and Walter Plimpton. Seventh edition, rewritten and enlarged. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1926, pp. xii + 203.

The editors of *The Order of Divine Service* have entirely rewritten and enlarged their useful 'Guide to the Rites and Ceremonies of the English Church,'



a book widely known and used in America as well as England. The revision has been necessitated by the development of ceremonial since the War. This volume, together with their annual volume, is intended to apply the principles of Western ceremonial to present day conditions. One questions some of the historical statements, *e.g.* (p. 63), that the stations of the Cross represent a devotion which 'has continued in unbroken tradition from the time of our Blessed Lord's ascension into Heaven.' But it is not as a historical work that the volume has been prepared—it is offered simply as a guide to Catholic ceremonial.

#### Biography

*Sören Kierkegaard: Seine Lebensentwicklung und seine Wirksamkeit als Schriftsteller.* By Edward Geismar. Tr. from the Danish. Pt. i. *Die Erziehung zum Beruf.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1927, pp. 121. M. 3.50 (in subsc. for the complete work; singly, 4.20).

In view of the widespread interest in Kierkegaard at the present time, particularly in Germany and the Scandinavian countries, the German translation and new edition of the standard biography of the great Danish Evangelical mystic (b. 1813) will be most welcome. Part i, now before us, presents the story of his youth in relation to the world into which he was born and in the midst of which he grew to manhood. The present chapters are entitled, 'Father and Son,' 'K.'s relation to the spiritual movements of his time,' 'His engagement and its effects.' They lay the foundation for the later structure of the biography, to be complete in six parts.

*Benedetto Croce.* An Autobiography. Tr. from the Italian by R. G. Collingwood. With a Preface by J. A. Smith. New York: Oxford, 1927, pp. 116 (5 s.).

Croce's *Autobiography* was written in 1915, when its author was just fifty, and was privately circulated among those who had a personal interest in the development of his mind. It has now been translated, unaltered, into English, and published. One is surprised to learn that the great Italian idealist did not choose philosophy at the outset of his career, but, as he confesses, 'was driven to philosophy by the longing to assuage my misery and to give an orientation to my moral and intellectual life.' Of considerable interest is the clear distinction which he draws between his own type of thought and Hegelianism. One suspects that the date of the original may have a bearing upon this distinction, though he points to an indigenous tradition in Italian philosophy (little known to American students) for his antecedents.

#### General History

*The New Past, and Other Essays on the Development of Civilization.* Ed. by E. H. Carter. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925, pp. viii + 183. 5 s.

Papers and lectures delivered at Aberystwyth University in 1924, and published in the interest of the increasing number of students and general readers



who find the 'new' past—i.e., the past as investigated and interpreted by modern historical methods—of genuine fascination. Dr. J. H. Breasted of Chicago gave the first and title lecture; others were on Some Origins of Civilization, by H. J. Fleure; its Diffusion, by W. J. Perry; the Biblical Record, by A. Nairne, etc. Professor G. Unwin's paper on 'Some Economic Factors in General History' is very interesting—and sobering. American readers will find the volume quite as useful as English.

*The Cambridge Ancient History.* Edited by J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock. Vol. V. *Athens, 478-401 B.C.* New York: Macmillan, 1927, pp. xxii + 554. \$7.00.

Volume IV of the *Cambridge Ancient History* narrated the defeat of the Persians by a Greece united under the leadership of Athens; the present volume continues the story of the city which from then on, in an increasing measure, was the Hellas of history. It is the story of the swift rise and sudden downfall of the Athenian empire, a movement requiring scarcely more than two generations. And it is told in the only way it can be told, since the researches of recent decades have laid bare the economic situation in Fifth-century Athens—known to American students very largely through the writings of Ferguson and Zimmern. Indeed, the volume begins with a chapter on 'The Economic Background of the Fifth Century,' by M. N. Tod. This is an admirable summary, in thirty-two pages, of present-day information on the subject and is accompanied by a fairly good map. In addition to an able marshalling of the facts, a very well-balanced judgment upon the significance of these facts is displayed, particularly in such matters as the estimate of population, the relations of free to servile labor, the cost of living, and public finance—questions notoriously difficult in all economic history, ancient as well as modern, and all the more difficult and liable to sweeping settlements on account of the scantiness of the data.

The Confederacy of Delos, 478-463 B.C., and the rise of Pericles and the Periclean Democracy, are handled by E. M. Walker, of Oxford, in chh. ii-iv. The narrative now halts for a chapter, while a clearly presented account of Fifth-century Attic drama is given, by J. T. Sheppard, interspersed with illuminating quotations from the tragedies. Chapter vi sets the stage for the second phase of that 'catena of conflicts,' the Peloponnesian War, with an account of Sicily, by R. Hackforth; chh. vii and viii, by F. E. Adcock, recount the renewal of the conflict—'The Breakdown of the Thirty Years Peace, 445-431 B.C.,' and the Archidamian War of the next ten years. Professor Ferguson, of Harvard, has the next four chapters, dealing with Sparta and the Peloponnesians, the Sicilian Expedition (in which the immortal narrative of Thucydides is retold with much freshness), the Oligarchical Movement at Athens, and the Fall of the Empire.

The volume is completed with three chapters on the intellectual and cultural history. Ch. xiii, 'The Age of Illumination,' by Professor Bury, sketches the reaction against the Ionian philosophy about the middle of the century, the rise of the Sophists, the Blasphemy Trials, and the life and death of Socrates—

wherein the prosecution receives somewhat less unfavorable treatment than has been customary. The indispensableness of Thucydides for Fifth-century Athenian history is recognized by the devotion of a chapter to a comparison of him with his great predecessor; the writer of the chapter is appropriately Dr. R. W. Macan, the commentator on Herodotus. Ch. xv, 'Greek Art and Architecture,' by J. D. Beazley and D. S. Robertson, concludes the volume. To it are added ten Notes, chiefly chronological, the usual very full Bibliographies, and three indexes.

While Western civilization endures, the story of Athens will never cease to be of interest. Her economic, political, social, intellectual history reads as if it were our own. The coöperation of scholars in two nations, in three great universities of this modern Western world in the rewriting, once more, of the classic story testifies not only to the debt we owe that ancient people but also to the undying fascination of their achievement and their fate.

*A History of the Ancient World.* By M. Rostovtzeff. Tr. from the Russian by J. D. Duff. Vol. I. *The Orient and Greece.* New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1926, pp. xxvi + 418, with 90 plates, 36 figures, and 5 maps. \$5.00. Vol. II. *Rome.* 1927, pp. xv + 387, with 96 plates, 12 figures, and 2 maps. \$5.00.

Professor Rostovtzeff's two volumes are an outstanding example of the new history, and well illustrate its merits. The beginning student and the general reader will find in them a clear, vivid, swift, unforgettable narrative of the life and activity of the ancient world in its successive periods, among successive peoples. The wood is thinned out, so one does not fail to see it for the trees: unimportant dates and details are omitted, while the more significant events and movements are set in full perspective. The result is a superb piece of historical writing which even the specialist will prize for its lucidity, balance, and proportion.

In the second place, the author of the *Economic and Social History of the Roman Empire* has given us a study of ancient history from the economic point of view. Not the affairs of the palace only but the development, expansion, and decline of commerce, town life, artistic and literary productiveness, agriculture, slavery, manufacture, the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor—all these factors come under review, and the student begins to grasp the continuity and interrelatedness of history. For the beginner this is a great gain, since some students arrive at a conception of the *unity* of history only after years of dissociated investigations. The conclusions of the great work on the economic history are briefly given in the second volume, on *Rome*, and the concluding chapter studies once more the problem of the decline of ancient civilization. Dr. Rostovtzeff discredits the economic, biological, political, theological, and other explanations, and prefers a psychological one. The decline was due to a changed attitude in men's minds—a change brought about through a long chain of circumstances, by "the aristocratic and exclusive nature of ancient civilization. The mental reaction [of privileged and unprivileged both] and the social division, taken together, deprived the ancient world of power to

maintain its civilization, or to defend it against internal dissolution and barbarian invasion from without" (p. 366).

In the third place, the multitude of illustrations with their accompanying text make the past live for the reader. The author is a master of archaeology, and the only danger is that the reader will stop with the illustrations and their fascinating interpretation, and fail to read the book! A large proportion of the plates illustrate the history of religion—some of them not being commonly accessible. There is no finer textbook for a survey course in the history of ancient civilization. A drawing is missing in Vol. II, p. 283; cuts 2 and 3 on Plate 77 are transposed; and the dates for Augustus on p. 368 need correction. The maps are fair, but might be improved—though no one should try to read history without a hand-atlas at his elbow.

These two volumes, like Professor Breasted's more elementary *Ancient Times*, and (for reference) the new *Cambridge Ancient History* make one envy the present generation of college students—and teachers—of the history of the ancient world.

#### Miscellaneous

*Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Second edition. Ed. by H. Gunkel and L. Zscharnack. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927, Lfg. 10-11 and 12-13. M. 3.60, each.

The present installments of the new RGG cover Vol. I from 'Bayern, ii' to 'Bonifatius II,' and hence include the important artt. on 'Beichte,' 'Bekehrung,' 'Bekenntnis,' 'Benedikt,' 'Bergpredigt,' 'Beruf,' and the large group on 'Bibel' and related subjects, e.g., 'Bibelgesellschaften.' The second edition represents a complete rewriting of the encyclopædia, with a wide representation of varied points of view, excellent cross-references, and up-to-date bibliographies.

*Saints in Sussex*. Poems and Plays. By Sheila Kaye-Smith. New York: Dutton, 1927, pp. vii + 136. \$2.50.

An attractive volume of poems, by the well-known Anglo-Catholic poet and novelist. The poems are ten in number, chiefly upon various festivals in the Church Calendar, filled with a tender love of nature and a fine spirit of Christian devotion. The plays are 'The Child Born at the Plough' (a Nativity play) and 'The Shepherd of Lattenden' (a Passion play).

*Die Andr. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung in Leipzig im Wechsel der Zeiten, 1852-1927*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1927, pp. xlv + 345, ill.

A handsomely prepared catalogue of the well-known publishing firm of Andreas Deichert in Leipzig, who celebrate this year their seventy-fifth anniversary. A historical account, with plates reproducing photographs of their more famous authors, prefaces the volume. Among these are a considerable number of theologians.

*Logos*. Ed. by R. Kroner. Vol. XV. Tübingen: Mohr, 1926, pp. iv + 380. M. 12.

*Logos* is 'an international journal for philosophy of culture, and deserves the notice of students of Philosophy, Ethics, Law, Psychology and Theology. Heft 3 of the present volume contains a brief article by Benedetto Croce on 'the Tendencies of Modern Philosophy' addressed, as an open letter, to the Philosophical Congress at Cambridge a year ago.

*Fern-Ost*. By Hans and Margarete Driesch. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1925, pp. 314. M. 8.

This is a pleasantly written narrative of a year spent in China and Japan by a German Professor and his wife in 1923. The visit was undertaken by Dr. Driesch to deliver certain courses of lectures on Philosophy at the Universities of Nanking and Peking,—incidentally also at certain other places for which arrangements were made after arrival. During these months he was, as he says, the guest of Young China. He describes his hosts flatteringly, perhaps with some pardonable exaggeration. The lighter part of the volume, which, by the way, is very handsomely printed and illustrated, is contributed by Madame Driesch and contains nothing more pretentious than a brightly written and rather detailed account of Oriental life as seen for the first time. Dr. Driesch reserves himself for the heavier part of the volume and his remarks on education, political and social conditions in China are often well worth consideration. Though frequently the guest of American missionaries, the German professor was quite evidently not very sympathetic with Christian missions and even less with American methods of missionary work. In fact American Puritanism has little charm for Dr. Driesch. American "Kultur" seems to him needlessly stern and material, and it is suggested that it is not quite what the new China really needs to save its soul. Naturally, it is hinted that Germany has more to offer and the writer is concerned with pointing out that Germany must make an effort, culturally as well as commercially, to recover the ground lost during the war. While the book has little contribution to make to our knowledge of China, it is a real contribution to our knowledge of the way in which many thoughtful Europeans envisage Americans and America. H. H. G.

